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1. INTRODUCTION
For the first time since the large refugee movements of the 1990s, which followed the
breakup of the bipolar order that had dominated Europe since the 1950s, a refugee cri-
sis tops European policy debate. The earlier crisis resulted from the political restructur-
ing of South-Eastern Europe after the Balkan wars and the dissolution of Yugoslavia,
which had displaced about 2,700,000 people by the end of 1995, over 700,000 of whom
sought asylum in EU Member States (see UNHCR, 2000). The current movements are
due primarily to the events that followed the 2001 bombings of New York’s twin towers
and the uprising in the Middle East commonly known as the ‘Arab Spring’. In 2015
* This paper was prepared for presentation at the 64th Panel Meeting of Economic Policy in October
2016. Luigi Minale gratefully acknowledges support from the Ministerio de Economıa y
Competitividad (Spain, Maria de Maeztu Grant) and Comunidad de Madrid (MadEco CM S2015/
HUM 3444). Christian Dustmann acknowledges funding through the Norface WSF Programme and
the DFG (DU1024/1 1) ERC Advanced Grant 323992 DMEA.
2
SUMMARY
This?paper?provides?a? comprehensive?analysis? of? refugee?migration,?with? emphasis? on? the? current? refugee? crisis.?
After?ﬁrst?reviewing? the? institutional?framework? laid?out?by? the?Geneva?Convention?for?Refugees,?we?demonstrate?
that,?despite?numerous?at?tempts?at?developing?a?common?European?asylum?policy,?EU?countries?continue?to?differ?
widely? in? interpretation? and? implementation.?We? then? describe? key? features? of? the? current? refugee? crisis? and?
document?the?overall?magnitudes?and?types?of?refugee?movements,?illegal?border?crossings?and?asylum?applications?
to?EU?Member?States.?We?next?study?the?labour?market?integration?of?past?refugee?migrants?to?EU?countries?and?
draw? conclusions? for? the? current? situation.?Finally,?we? turn? to? the? economics? of? refugee?migrations,? contrasting?
economic?and?refugee?migrants,?discussing? the? trade?offs?between? long? term?asylum?and? temporary?protection?and?
highlighting? the? beneﬁts? of? well? coordinated? national? asylum? policies.? We? conclude? with? several? policy?
recommendations.
JEL?codes:?F22,?J15,?J61
alone, Europe received a total of 1.5 million asylum applications, an unprecedented
high that is almost double the previous 1992 peak of 850,000.
At least three features distinguish the present refugee crisis from that in the early
1990s: first, the refugee movements of the early 1990s happened in the aftermath of de-
cades of cold war, a dark era from which an optimistic Europe emerged eager to em-
brace new economic opportunities and European integration and enlargement. The
current crisis, in contrast, falls upon an enlarged Europe, still entangled in the after-
shocks of a deep recession, riddled by populist and separatist national movements and
challenged by deeply divergent views about how to address this humanitarian crisis.
Second, whereas the Balkan wars were considered mainly a Western responsibility and
Western resolve finally helped to restore stability, the current crisis involves a multitude
of actors and geo-political interests over which Western nations have limited power.
And third, the refugees who are currently heading towards Europe are perceived to be
culturally more distinct and greater in number than those in the early 1990s.
As a result of these differences, the current crisis is characterized by at least three po-
litical challenges: First, and most important, European nations can only marginally influ-
ence the primary causes of the conflicts inducing current refugee flows. There is thus no
clear indication of when such flows might abate, and no clear time frame for when those
who have fled the conflict can be resettled, if at all. Such a lack of predictability creates
uncertainty and concern among the populations in the receiving countries, whose fears
are easily exploitable by populist movements. Second, the dire economic situations in
which many European countries find themselves, coupled with the different views about
humanitarian responsibilities, impede political progress and solutions. Last, the lack of a
clear legal framework; the unsuitability of past regulations, which have led to confusing
ad hoc exceptions; the differences in implementation and interpretation of the underly-
ing Geneva Convention for Refugees (GCR) across European countries; and the chal-
lenges that the current crisis poses for the Schengen Agreement have led to a situation
in which political progress is proving extremely difficult.
In this paper, we provide background and shed new light on the complexities of the
refugee crisis Europe faces. We first answer the question ‘who is a refugee?’ (Section 2).
We start from the definition laid out in the 1951 GCR and emphasize the tremendous
heterogeneity in how different European countries interpret and implement it. We ar-
gue that this diversity in GCR interpretation and implementation is one important rea-
son for the current lack of political progress that we are witnessing. We then identify the
major source areas of the current crisis and resulting migrations (Section 3) by docu-
menting the sharp increases in asylum applications to EUMember States from 2009 on-
wards, and its unequal distribution across EUMember States.
In Section 4, we use data from the 2008 wave of the EU Labour Force Survey to pro-
file the economic integration of past refugee migrants to EU countries. In particular, we
show that migrants who arrived for humanitarian reasons were less likely to be em-
ployed than economic migrants from the same origin areas despite similar levels of edu-
cation. This evidence from past refugee movements underscores the particular
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challenges to host countries and indicates the need for more proactive policies to prevent
the poor economic outcomes of refugees.
We then examine the economics of refugee migrations by first contrasting refugee mi-
gration with economic migration (Section 5). We argue that whereas the latter is a
choice for all parties involved, refugee migrants are forced to leave their home country
because of threats to their own lives or those of their family, and countries that receive
refugees do so for humanitarian not economic reasons. Further, host countries tend not
to have economic integration of the refugee migrants as their primary objective.
Receiving countries can decide whether to reject asylum claims, grant full GCR refugee
status (which often leads to permanent settlement in the host country), or offer tempo-
rary forms of humanitarian support. These different options, by creating different de-
grees of permanence for individual refugees, greatly affect their incentives to integrate
socially and contribute economically. We suggest that clear rules and support mecha-
nisms are needed early on in the migration history, together with fast processing times,
fast access to the labour market and active integration programmes. We conclude
Section 5 by highlighting the economic advantages of increased coordination in the asy-
lum process across countries; for instance, at the EU level. Such increased coordination
would reduce the free-rider problem inherent in the provision of (the public good of) ref-
ugee status, minimize the costs of providing asylum to a given number of refugees and
alleviate countries’ incentives to implement policies aimed at deterring asylum applica-
tions, which may harm refugee integration.
We finally discuss the implications of earlier evidence for optimal and feasible refugee
policies that Europe should implement not simply to address the current crisis but also
to deal with future migration developments.
2. WHO IS A REFUGEE?
2.1. The international framework
Modern refugee legislation has its origins in the aftermath of World War II and in the
refugee crises of the preceding interwar years. Grounded in Article 14 of the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which recognizes the right of persons to seek
asylum from persecution in other countries, the United Nations Geneva Convention re-
lating to the Status of Refugees (GCR) was adopted in 1951. In its first article, the con-
vention defines the refugee as follows:
[any person who] owing to a well founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, na
tionality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of
his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection
of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former ha
bitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return
to it.
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The GCR not only broadly defines the rights of refugees and the obligations of hosting
states, but establishes the principle of non refoulement (Article 33), which prevents host
countries from returning refugees against their will to any territory in which they fear a
threat to life or freedom.1 Although the convention was originally limited to persons flee-
ing events occurring within Europe and before 1 January 1951, the 1967 Protocol re-
moved these limitations and endowed the GCR with universal coverage. As of April
2015, 145 states have signed the 1951 Convention and 142 have signed both the
Convention and the 1967 Protocol.
Being the only global legal instruments that explicitly regulate refugee rights, the
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol still define the international framework regulat-
ing asylum policy. Nevertheless, being based on the concept of individual persecution, the
GCR definition of refugees does not specifically address the more general issue of civil-
ians fleeing wars and conflicts. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), however, considers that persons fleeing the civil wars and ethnic, tribal and
religious violence and whose country of origin is unwilling or unable to protect them
should be considered refugees even if they are fleeing a general rather than an individual
threat. Hence, some regional human rights treaties have since expanded the GCR defi-
nition to include these people.2 On the other hand, some countries, particularly in
Western Europe, argue that civilians fleeing conflicts should not be granted full refugee
status. As a result, they have developed different forms of temporary/subsidiary humani-
tarian protection for these people. These alternative hosting schemes have been used in
Europe to respond to sudden and massive influxes of war-displaced individuals (e.g.
from the 1990s conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Kosovo). In these cases, each civil-
ian belonging to a certain group is considered a refugee prima facie (i.e. in the absence of
evidence to the contrary), eliminating the need for individual status determination. Such
group determination permits speedy admittance to safe countries, but with no guarantee
of permanent asylum.
At the same time, because the GCR does not stipulate how receiving countries should
determine whether an individual meets the criteria for refugee status, each signatory
country employs its own procedures for status recognition, with many (especially in the
developing world) still lacking any formalized system.3 Similarly, although the GCR
1 ‘No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the
frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion’ (Geneva Convention, Article
33.1).
2 For instance, the African Union (formerly the Organization of African Unity) adopted the ‘Convention
Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa’ in 1969 while the Organization of
American States signed the ‘Cartagena Declaration on Refugees’ in 1984. In both cases, the 1951
GCR definition was expanded to include those compelled to leave their country owing to such threats
as external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or generalized violence.
3 Turkey, for instance, did not establish a legal framework for asylum and create an agency responsible
for assessing asylum applications until 2013. Syrian refugees, however, are managed outside this system
and benefit from a group based temporary protection scheme.
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clearly states the rights and entitlements of refugees access to courts (Article 16), labour
market (Articles 17 19), housing (Article 21), public education (Article 22) and so forth
it limits the enjoyment of these benefits to ‘refugees lawfully staying’ in the host country
territory (and thus not to current and rejected asylum seekers). It also uses overly broad
formulations (e.g. ‘treatment as favourable as possible’), which leave much room for
host-state interpretation. Not surprisingly, such breadth has resulted in disparities as the
different governments adapt their asylum laws to their own resources, refugee migration
histories and political and national security concerns (see Section 2.4.).
2.2. From displacement to refugee status
In Figure 1, we reconstruct the progression from displacement from region of residence
to eventual recognition as a refugee in a third country. Those who flee their homes are
technically defined as ‘displaced persons’, reflecting their displacement by such trau-
matic events as violence, conflict, or natural disaster, and are classified by the UNHCR
as their ‘population of concern’. These individuals may be divided into those who are
‘internally displaced’ (IDPs) that is, forced to leave their homes but still residing in the
country of origin and those who have moved to a third country. These latter can be
further divided into those who have moved to a neighbouring country (‘first asylum
country’) and those who have managed (either legally or illegally) to reach a country
that accepts asylum applications and offers GCR refugee status or other forms of hu-
manitarian protection (‘final destination’ country). Obviously, these three outcomes can
also represent consecutive steps in the same process.
In general, displaced persons in neighbouring countries are hosted in refugee camps
but, not being subject to a formal status determination process, do not usually have rec-
ognized refugee status. UNHCR defines these individuals as being in a ‘refugee-like’ sit-
uation, as belonging to ‘groups of persons who are outside their country or territory of
Figure 1. From displacement to refugee status
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origin and who face protection risks similar to those of refugees, but for whom refugee
status has, for practical or other reasons, not been ascertained’ (UNHCR, 2015a). In
fact, ‘first asylum’ countries receiving inflows of displaced persons are often developing
countries that do not and usually cannot afford to have any formal system in place
to manage and assess asylum applications. Displaced people in refugee camps are thus
often subsidized by UNHCR, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and interna-
tional aid and can remain in that situation for years. For these persons, UNHCR oper-
ates ‘resettlement schemes’ that transfer refugees from one host country to another that
has agreed to admit them and ultimately grant them permanent settlement. Candidates
for resettlement undergo a formal refugee status determination process while still in the
origin or first asylum country, after which successful candidates are relocated to the des-
tination countries. A major advantage of the resettlement schemes is that displaced peo-
ple do not need to engage in dangerous and illegal trips to find a safe haven abroad.
Currently, however, only a relatively small number of states participate in the UNHCR
resettlement programme, with the United States being the world’s top resettlement
country, followed by Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the Scandinavian countries.
Only a relatively small fraction of the total displaced population manages to reach a
country that has a formal system of refugee status recognition (see also Hatton, 2009).
These arrivals are usually unauthorized border crossings using forged documents and/
or the help of smugglers. Once arrived in the host country, displaced persons have the
right to apply for asylum and reside in the host country until a decision is made. The
process outcome can either be recognition of full Geneva refugee status, the offer of
some form of temporary humanitarian protection, or a rejection. Rejected asylum
seekers have to either leave the host country autonomously or be returned to their home
country. For many, however, the principle of non refoulement applies, preventing the host
country from expelling these individuals but leaving them with an undefined status
(which often leads to undocumented residency). In general, return to the home country,
although not represented in Figure 1, is an option at all stages of the process.
In its own records, UNHCR counts as refugees all individuals residing in a third
country who are in a refugee-like situation, who enjoy formally recognized refugee status
(under the GCR, 1967 Protocol, or any of the regional conventions on asylum), or who
have been granted complementary and temporary forms of protection (UNHCR,
2015a). Hence, throughout the remainder of the paper, we adopt their broad definition
of refugees but distinguish individuals with refugee-like status from those with recog-
nized refugee status whenever needed.
2.3. Displaced population, refugees and asylum seekers: evidence from
UNHCR data
Table 1 provides an overview of the worldwide population of displaced individuals.
The table shows that, as of 2015, most of the almost 59 million displaced individuals
worldwide were still residing within the borders of their home countries; only 30.7%
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had left their country to become refugees abroad. For European (2.7 million) and South
American (7.8 million) displaced persons, this share is 25.7 and 8%, respectively, but for
the 19 million Africans and 29 million Asians displaced by conflict or violence, it reaches
31.6 and 36.5%, respectively. It is also worth noting that, as the bottom panel of
Table 1 shows, most of these international movements involve neighbouring countries
located on the same continent. For instance, in 2015, almost 82% of African refugees
were residing in another African country, while the corresponding values for Asian,
European and South American refugees were 81, 94 and 54%, respectively. Europe as
a whole was, in 2015, hosting 15% of the world’s refugees.
Figure 2 plots the time series of world refugee population (in millions) by continent of
origin. The stock of refugees has been large over the entire 1980 2015 period.
Nevertheless, large differences exist between continents, with refugee populations origi-
nating mostly from Asia and Africa dwarfing refugee populations from South America
and Europe, including those induced by the Balkan wars. The figure also illustrates two
notable peaks in the total refugee population, one in the early 1990s and the other in
the 2010s, with a further rapid surge in the most recent years. The first peak, when the
total refugee population reached 15 million people, was related to the Balkan wars and
to conflicts in Africa (Rwanda, Somalia) and Asia (Iraq, Afghanistan). The second peak,
starting around 2008, corresponds to the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, and to the
consequences of the Arab Spring uprisings in North Africa. The 2014 2015 surge is
mostly explained by the Syrian civil war. The graph further shows that in 2015, Asian
citizens accounted for more than 9.5 million refugees and African refugees for over 5
Table 1. Origin and destination of UNHCR’s population of concern (year 2015)
Continent of origin
Africa Asia Europe South America World
UNHCR population of concern (thous.) 19,124 29,423 2,672 7,765 58,991
Refugees (thous.) 6,050 10,753 686 625 18,122
of which are asylum seekers (thous.) 659 1,146 179 177 2,162
Share of refugees 0.316 0.365 0.257 0.080 0.307
Refugees distribution across destinations
Africa 0.819 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.289
Asia 0.056 0.813 0.003 0.000 0.501
Europe 0.101 0.129 0.937 0.028 0.147
North America 0.019 0.025 0.057 0.430 0.039
Oceania 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.000 0.004
South America 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.541 0.020
Total 1 1 1 1 1
Notes: The table reports, separately for each continent of origin and for the World as a whole, the stock of the
overall UNCHR’s population of concern (row 1), the stock of refugees (including asylum seekers, row 2) and the
stock of asylum seekers (row 3). All ﬁgures are expressed in thousand. Row 4 reports the share of refugees (includ
ing asylum seekers) out of the total UNHCR population of concern. The bottom rows report the distribution of
refugees (including asylum seekers) from each continent of origin across continents of destination.
Source: Own calculations based on UNCHR data.
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million, with the remaining million equally split between European and South
American refugees.
In Figure 3, we report the total number of asylum applications (in millions) worldwide
in each year between 2000 and 2015, distinguishing again by continent of origin. From
a global figure of over 0.5 million asylum applications per year in the 2001 2002, this
Figure 2. Evolution of refugee populations by origin continent (1980–2015)
Note: The ﬁgure reports the evolution of the stock of refugees (in millions) by continent of origin, and overall, be
tween 1980 and 2015.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UNHCR data.
Figure 3. Annual number of asylum applications by origin continent (2000–2015)
Note: The ﬁgure reports the annual number of asylum applications (in millions) by continent of origin, and overall,
between 2000 and 2015.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UNHCR data.
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number declined to approximately 0.3 million per year between 2004 and 2010 and
then began increasing sharply. In 2015, more than 2 million asylum applications were
filed worldwide, a clearly unprecedented number given the just over 850,000 that made
up the 1992 peak (Hatton, 2016). In 2015, the majority of asylum seekers originated
from Asia (due especially to Syrian and Afghan asylum seekers), which accounted for al-
most 1.6 million applications.
In Table 2, we draw on the latest available UNHCR figures, updated to December
2015, to show the estimated number of Syrian citizens at different stages of the process
that goes from displacement to being recognized as refugee. Of a total population of al-
most 22 million people (in 2011), almost 12 million of Syrian citizens (54%) are currently
displaced by the conflict. Slightly more than half of them (6.6 million) are still in Syria, be-
ing IDP. Just 1.5% (180 thousand) have been offered resettlement or resettled to a safe
host country. The remaining 43.2% (5.1 million) have autonomously reached a third
country. The vast majority of this latter group (89%; 4.6 million) is hosted under a
refugee-like status in a neighbouring country: 2.5 million in Turkey, 1 million in Lebanon,
Table 2. Different stages of the process of becoming a refugee: the case of Syrians
Millions %
Total population (pre conﬂict) 21.96
Not displaced 10.10 46.0
Displaced: 11.86 54.0
of which: Internally displaced 6.56 55.3
Offered Resettlement (as of April 2016) 0.18 1.5
Refugees/Asylum seekers at 31 December 2015: 5.12 43.2
of which: in Neighbouring countries
(as of 31December 2015):
4.56 89.0
of which: Turkey 2.50 54.9
Lebanon 1.06 23.3
Jordan 0.63 13.8
Iraq 0.24 5.4
Egypt 0.12 2.6
in EU28 þNOR þCH 0.49 9.6
of which: Germany 0.20 40.8
Sweden 0.10 20.8
Austria 0.03 6.8
Netherlands 0.03 6.5
Hungary 0.02 3.9
Notes: The table reports the total Syrian population, the number of internally displaced Syrians, the number of
Syrian citizens offered Resettlement to a safe host country (the ﬁgure includes both conﬁrmed pledges and indi
viduals actually resettled) and those hosted in the EU and in neighbouring countries (including both asylum
seekers and individuals with recognized refugee status).
Source: Own calculations based on UNHCR Population Statistics data.
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630 thousand in Jordan, 240 thousand in Iraq and 120 thousand in Egypt. About half a
million Syrians have reached an EU country and were granted asylum or are waiting for
their asylum claim to processed: 40% of them are hosted in Germany (200 thousand), fol-
lowed by Sweden (100), Austria (30), the Netherlands (30) and Hungary (20).
As for the case of Syrian citizens, UNHCR resettlement schemes still account for a
relatively minor fraction of the refugee flows. The UNHCR estimated that over 1.1 mil-
lion of refugees are globally in need of resettlement in 2016 (UNHCR, 2015b). The lat-
est records show that 26 countries admitted a total of 105,200 resettled refugees in
2014, leading to a total of 900 thousand resettlements over the last decade (UNHCR,
2015a). The United States are by far the major recipient of resettled refugees. In 2014,
United States admitted 73 thousand refugees (70% of the total), followed by Canada
(12%), Australia (11%), Sweden (2%), Norway and Finland (1% each).
2.4. Asylum policy in Europe
2.4.1. Towards a common European policy. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the
gradual fall of the Iron Curtain triggered massive across-state movements that particu-
larly affected Western European countries. The collapse of former Yugoslavia and the
conflicts that tore apart the region for almost a decade generated additional flows of
people seeking asylum. These large refugee inflows across Europe created a need to re-
think asylum policies in all European countries. They also generated a shift towards a
higher degree of coordination at the EU level. For example, since the 1990 adoption of
the Dublin Convention, the EU has tried to develop a common European asylum sys-
tem with the principal aim of clarifying which receiving country is responsible for asylum
claims and preventing multiple application submissions in Member States. The conven-
tion itself, which came into force in 1997 1998, established the principle that the
Member State through which the asylum seeker first entered the EU is responsible for
assessing the asylum claim. To ensure effective application of the convention, in 2000,
the EU approved the EURODAC Regulation, which established a common asylum fin-
gerprint database. Between 1999 and 2005, several additional legislative measures were
implemented to harmonize common minimum standards for asylum. In 2000, for in-
stance, the European Refugee Fund (ERF) was created to share the costs of reception,
integration and voluntary repatriation of people in need of international protection.
The ERF was endowed with e630 million over the period 2008 2013 (105 million per
year). In 2014, the ERF was replaced by the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund
(AMIF), which has a budget of e3.137 billion for the seven years 2014 2020, or e448
million per year.4 It is worth noting, that the resources targeted to these funds are
4 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home affairs/financing/fundings/migration asylum borders/index en.htm,
accessed on 10 February 2017.
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relatively small when compared to other EU funds. For instance, the European Social
Fund (ESF) receives a funding of e10 billion a year,5 and the European Agricultural
Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) has been endowed with e100 billion over the
seven years 2014 2020, or e14.2 billion per year.6
Yet despite these persistent attempts to establish a single and harmonized European
asylum policy, individual Member States have de facto maintained full sovereignty over
the implementation of their national asylum policies. In addition, as highlighted by the
current refugee crisis, the European common policy on asylum is riddled with weak-
nesses. One notable example is the so-called EU ‘refugee relocation system’ based on a
September 2015 EU agreement to relocate 160 thousand refugees from Italy and
Greece to other European countries over a period of two years. Because several coun-
tries voted against the scheme and refused to participate, as of 15 September 2016, only
9% (14,478) of the promised 160,000 places have been made available by some of the
participating countries and less than 5% (4,890) of the refugees have actually been
relocated.7
2.4.2. Heterogeneity in asylum policies across Europe. The different exposures
to refugee inflows (see Section 3.3.) and the lack of an effective European-level mecha-
nism to ‘spread the burden’ of hosting refugee populations, led many countries to imple-
ment procedures aimed at reducing inflows into their territories. One such strategy is to
tighten visa requirements and border enforcement to reduce the number of asylum
seekers that manage to reach the territory and apply for refugee status. Another is to
vary the efficiency of application assessment and/or become stricter about granting pro-
tection to applicants. Governments can also decide whether to grant full GCR refugee
status or to offer subsidiary forms of humanitarian protection. They can also greatly im-
pact the treatment given to asylum seekers and refugees by regulating and limiting their
access to such advantages as benefit entitlements, the labour market and choice of resi-
dence. In this section, we document this heterogeneity using both UNHCR data and a
summary of national legislative differences.
UNHCR data (see Data Appendix A.1) permit the construction of informative indica-
tors of the efficiency and ‘generosity’ of national asylum policies. First, because govern-
ments may try to discourage potential refugees by under-investing in the staff and
resources for screening thereby prolonging wait times and increasing outcome uncer-
tainty we use share of applications evaluated over total submitted each year to
compare the speed and efficiency of application processing in different countries.
We illustrate the pace of processing applications in Figure 4, whose vertical axis reports
5 http://ec.europa.eu/esf/main.jsp?catId 35&langId en, accessed on 10 February 2017.
6 http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rural development 2014 2020/index en.htm, accessed on 10
February 2017.
7 http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home affairs/what we do/policies/european agenda migration/press mate
rial/docs/state of play relocation en.pdf, accessed on 19 September 2016.
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the yearly average of the application shares processed in EU15þNORþCHE coun-
tries over the 2000 2014 period. This share varies from a minimum of 37% in Greece
to a maximum of 73% in the UK, with an overall average of approximately 57%.
These numbers imply that it takes Greece an average of almost 3 years to process all ap-
plications received in any given year, while the UK takes less than 1.5 years. The figure
also suggests that the pace of application processing is not mechanically determined by
the number of applications received (per 10,000 population), which are reported on the
horizontal axis. In fact, the numbers of applications processed each year in the three
countries that have received the largest inflows of applicants (relative to population) in
the last 15 years Sweden, Norway and Switzerland are close to, or even above, the
European average. On the contrary, among the three countries that received the small-
est inflows, Portugal and Italy have processing times close to the European average
(both around 60%) while Spain only manages to assess 47% of its yearly application in-
flow. While some of the cross-country variations in processing time could be due to dif-
ferences in the composition of asylum applications,8 the absence of a correlation
between processing time and number of applications received suggests that countries
can choose their own application processing pace and that those receiving larger inflows
probably invest more resources in their screening processes.
Figure 4. Share of asylum applications cleared and applications received in
EU15, Norway and Switzerland (yearly averages for 2000–2014)
Note: The table plots the share of applications cleared against the applications received for EU15 countries,
Norway and Switzerland. Numbers are yearly averages for the 2000 2014 period.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UNHCR data.
8 Some countries, for instance, may systematically receive more applications from a group of potential
refugees that are inherently harder to evaluate, slowing down the screening process.
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Figure 5 demonstrates that European countries also differ widely in their asylum gen-
erosity, which we measure here as the ‘total recognition rate’, the number of positive de-
cisions to grant some form of humanitarian protection (GCR refugee status or other
subsidiary protection) over the total number of applications processed. On average, only
about 10% of applications submitted in EU15þNORþCHE countries between 2000
and 2014 led to recognition of refugee status. This share, however, varies from as little as
2% in Greece to approximately 18% in Denmark. Nevertheless, the figure shows a posi-
tive correlation (fitted line) between yearly shares of applications processed and recogni-
tion rates: countries that are more efficient in screening applications tend also to be more
generous in offering refugee status.9 This positive slope suggests that European countries
that are faster in screening applications are not achieving this target simply by rejecting
more applicants. On the contrary, countries like Belgium, France, Denmark and the UK
seem to combine a relatively high degree of both efficiency and generosity.
As discussed in Section 2.1., national governments maintain a substantial degree of
discretion in deciding upon the exact status to be granted to asylum applicants. Using
UNHCR statistical data, we can measure the ‘Geneva refugee recognition rate’ as the
share of applicants accorded full GCR refugee status over the total granted some form
of humanitarian protection. Table 3 reports the total number of asylum applications ap-
proved by each country in 2014, together with the share of individuals approved for full
Figure 5. Refugee status recognition rates and share of asylum applications
cleared in EU15, Norway and Switzerland (yearly average for 2000–2014)
Note: The ﬁgure plots the total recognition rate against the share of applications cleared for EU15 countries,
Norway and Switzerland. Numbers refer to yearly averages for the 2000 2014 period.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UNHCR data.
9 Austria and Germany appear as outliers in this graph, having relatively high recognition rates but
also relatively long processing times.
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GCR status. In 2014, 204,092 asylum applications were approved in European
Economic Area (EEA) countries, the vast majority in a Western European country. Of
these, 58% were given full GCR refugee status, while the others received only subsidiary
protection. There is, however, considerable heterogeneity in the frequency of refugee
status across countries:,whereas Italy, the Netherlands and Spain, for instance, granted
GCR status to less than 25% of total successful applicants, this share was around 80% in
Austria, Belgium and Germany and 91% in the UK. These differences, although possi-
bly indicative of different interpretations of the common legal framework, may also be
Table 3. Total number of approved asylum applications and share with full
Geneva refugee status by host country
Host country All origin countries Syria Afghanistan
refugee
status
granted
share with
full Geneva
status
refugee
status
granted
share with
full Geneva
status
refugee
status
granted
share with
full Geneva
status
Austria 11,351 0.769 3,653 0.913 1,534 0.576
Belgium 8,479 0.810 1,705 0.740 1,269 0.638
Bulgaria 7,000 0.737 6,406 0.753 24 0.292
Croatia 26 0.615
Cyprus 1,243 0.073 926 0.000
Czech Rep. 376 0.218 71 0.000
Denmark 5,670 0.689 4,002 0.782 128 0.188
Estonia 20 1.000
Finland 1,346 0.372 96 0.365 119 0.202
France 21,093 0.789 1,468 0.640 712 0.431
Germany 40,563 0.821 23,859 0.860 3,403 0.595
Greece 3,852 0.539 718 0.735 827 0.440
Hungary 476 0.504 171 0.643 75 0.227
Ireland 504 1.000
Italy 20,582 0.177 313 0.732 2,398 0.106
Latvia 23 0.130
Lithuania 91 0.264
Luxembourg 197 0.802
Malta 1,478 0.158 366 0.016
Netherlands 13,250 0.207 5,439 0.064 415 0.439
Norway 5,076 0.754 1,294 0.444 317 0.577
Poland 450 0.593 132 0.871
Portugal 109 0.165
Romania 753 0.503 467 0.385 51 0.627
Slovakia 113 0.124
Slovenia 44 0.773
Spain 1,583 0.241 1,162 0.105
Sweden 32,347 0.331 16,404 0.107 1,765 0.405
Switzerland 14,123 0.439 2,821 0.325 1,855 0.156
United Kingdom 11,874 0.906 1,423 0.976 713 0.851
EU15 þ NOR þ CHE 191,999 0.578 64,357 0.545 15,455 0.431
EU28 þ NOR þ CHE 204,092 0.576 72,896 0.553 15,605 0.431
Notes: The table reports, for each EU host country, the number of asylum applications approved and the share of
applications that were given full refugee status according to the Geneva Convention in 2014 ﬁrst for all countries
of origin, and then separately for Syrians and Afghans. In countries with more than one level in the procedure
(ﬁrst instance, appeal, etc.), the numbers for both procedures have been added up.
Source: 2014 UNHCR Statistical Year Book.
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due to differences in the type of applications received. For this reason, in columns 3 4
and 5 6 of the table, we focus on Syrian and Afghan refugees, respectively. Once again,
we observe substantial heterogeneity in the treatment of refugees from the same origin
countries, with Syrians more likely to receive full GCR status than Afghans in almost all
receiving countries. Nevertheless, even though in countries like the UK (97%) and
Austria (91%), almost all Syrian refugees are given full Geneva status, this share is as low
as 10% in large destination countries like Sweden. The GCR status recognition rate for
Afghan refugees similarly varies from 85% in the UK to 10% in Italy.
National asylum policies can also vary along many other dimensions, a few examples
of which we summarize in Table 4 at different stages of the process.10 National govern-
ments can, for example, employ lists of ‘safe countries of origin’ to accelerate asylum ap-
plication screening, which in the case of EU Member States means all other Member
States (plus Switzerland and Norway) as safe countries of origin. In general, to qualify as
a safe third country, a nation must implement the GCR and offer potential refugees the
opportunity to apply for asylum.11 Yet, only eight EU countries Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Germany, France, Ireland, Luxembourg and the UK have adopted official
lists of safe origin countries outside the EU, and even these lists vary widely in both num-
ber and countries included. For example, whereas Ireland’s list contains only one coun-
try (South Africa), the UK’s includes 26 countries. Of these, Bosnia and Herzegovina
(BIH) and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (MKD) are considered safe by
all list adopters except Ireland. Albania (ALB) and Montenegro (MNE) are considered
safe by all but Germany and Ireland, and Kosovo (RKS) is deemed safe by Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg and the UK, but not by France, Germany or Ireland.
A related concept, central to the Dublin Convention, is the ‘safe third country’, a con-
struct used to justify the rejection of applications from asylum seekers who transited
through a safe country (where they could have applied for asylum) and subsequent
forced return to that country.
All EU countries tend to impose restrictions on asylum seekers’ labour market access,
a constraint intended to reduce incentives for economic migrants to submit (unfounded)
asylum applications. In general, asylum seekers are prevented from being (legally) em-
ployed for a minimum period that should theoretically correspond to the time required
to process their claims. According to EU Directive 2013/33, Member States must
10 The European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE; http://www.ecre.org/) recently created an
Asylum Information Database (AIDA) containing information on asylum procedures, reception con
ditions and detention across 16 EU Member States. This database provides a clear picture of the cur
rent heterogeneity in policies across these states and is one of the main sources used here.
11 In a highly controversial decision, Norway’s parliament agreed in November 2015 to amend the
Immigration Act, removing the requirement that a country accept and process asylum applications to be
considered a safe third country. This change implies that Russia can be deemed safe to receive asylum
seekers and allows Norway to forcedly deport asylum seekers entering through the Artic border with Russia
(the ‘artic route’). In similar manner, a March 2016 EU agreement with Turkey implies that Greece can
consider Turkey a safe country, allowing Greece to transfer asylum seekers from its territory to Turkey’s.
16
T
ab
le
4.
E
xa
m
p
le
s
of
h
et
er
og
en
ei
ty
in
as
yl
u
m
p
ol
ic
ie
s
ac
ro
ss
E
u
ro
p
ea
n
co
u
n
tr
ie
s
L
ist
of
sa
fe
co
un
tr
ie
s
of
or
ig
in
A
sy
lu
m
se
ek
er
s:
de
ni
ed
ac
ce
ss
to
th
e
la
bo
ur
m
ar
ke
t
D
isp
er
sa
lp
ol
ic
y
A
sy
lu
m
se
ek
er
s:
ef
fe
ct
iv
e
ac
ce
ss
to
th
e
he
al
th
ca
re
#
co
un
tr
ie
s
co
un
tr
ie
s:
M
ax
im
um
du
ra
tio
n
of
th
e
pr
oh
ib
iti
on
in
pl
ac
e
in
th
e
pa
st
du
ra
tio
n:
A
us
tr
ia
ye
s
9
þ
E
E
A
C
ou
nt
ri
es
/
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
A
L
B
,B
IH
,M
K
D
,R
K
S,
M
N
E
,S
R
B
,C
A
N
,
A
U
S,
N
Z
L
Y
es
3
m
on
th
s
no
no
W
ith
lim
ita
tio
ns
B
el
gi
um
ye
s
7
A
L
B
,B
IH
,M
K
D
,R
K
S,
M
N
E
,S
R
B
,I
N
D
Y
es
6
m
on
th
s
no
no
Y
es
D
en
m
ar
k
ye
s
14
þ
E
FT
A
C
ou
nt
ri
es
A
L
B
,B
IH
,M
K
D
,R
K
S,
M
N
E
,S
R
B
,M
D
A
,
R
U
S,
C
A
N
,U
SA
,
M
N
G
,A
U
S,
JP
N
,N
Z
L
–
–
no
ye
s
19
86
–1
99
8
–
Fi
nl
an
d
no
Y
es
3
m
on
th
s
(v
al
id
tr
av
el
do
c-
um
en
th
ol
de
r)
an
d
6
m
on
th
s(
no
va
lid
tr
av
el
do
cu
m
en
t)
no
no
–
Fr
an
ce
ye
s
16
A
L
B
,A
R
M
,B
E
N
,B
IH
,
C
PV
,G
E
O
,G
H
A
,
IN
D
,M
K
D
,M
U
S,
M
D
A
,M
N
G
,M
N
E
,
SE
N
,S
R
B
,T
Z
A
Y
es
12
m
on
th
s
no
no
W
ith
L
im
ita
tio
ns
G
er
m
an
y
ye
s
5
B
IH
,M
K
D
,S
R
B
,G
H
A
,
SE
N
Y
es
3
m
on
th
s
no
no
W
ith
L
im
ita
tio
ns
G
re
ec
e
no
N
o
Im
m
ed
ia
te
no
no
W
ith
L
im
ita
tio
ns
Ir
el
an
d
ye
s
1
Z
A
F
N
o
ye
s
20
00
–
(.
..
)
Y
es
It
al
y
no
Y
es
6
m
on
th
s
no
no
Y
es
(co
nt
in
ue
d)
17
T
ab
le
4.
C
on
ti
n
u
ed
L
ist
of
sa
fe
co
un
tr
ie
s
of
or
ig
in
A
sy
lu
m
se
ek
er
s:
de
ni
ed
ac
ce
ss
to
th
e
la
bo
ur
m
ar
ke
t
D
isp
er
sa
lp
ol
ic
y
A
sy
lu
m
se
ek
er
s:
ef
fe
ct
iv
e
ac
ce
ss
to
th
e
he
al
th
ca
re
#
co
un
tr
ie
s
co
un
tr
ie
s:
M
ax
im
um
du
ra
tio
n
of
th
e
pr
oh
ib
iti
on
in
pl
ac
e
in
th
e
pa
st
du
ra
tio
n:
L
ux
em
bo
ur
g
ye
s
12
A
L
B
,B
E
N
*,
B
IH
,C
PV
,
H
R
V
,M
K
D
,G
H
A
*,
R
K
S,
M
N
E
,S
E
N
,
SR
B
,U
K
R
Y
es
9
m
on
th
s
no
no
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
no
Y
es
6
m
on
th
s
ye
s
19
87
–(
..
.)
W
ith
L
im
ita
tio
ns
N
or
w
ay
no
Y
es
U
nd
eﬁ
ne
d
ye
s
19
94
–
(.
..
)
Po
rt
ug
al
no
Y
es
1
m
on
th
no
no
Sp
ai
n
no
Y
es
6
m
on
th
s
no
no
Sw
ed
en
no
N
o
Im
m
ed
ia
te
no
no
19
84
–1
99
4
W
ith
L
im
ita
tio
ns
U
ni
te
d
K
in
gd
om
ye
s
26
A
L
B
,B
IH
,M
K
D
,R
K
S,
M
N
E
,S
R
B
,M
D
A
,
U
K
R
,G
M
B
*,
G
H
A
*,
K
E
N
*,
L
B
R
*,
M
W
I*
,
M
L
I,
M
U
S*
,N
G
A
,
Z
A
F,
SL
E
*,
B
O
L
,
B
R
A
,E
C
U
*,
JA
M
,
PE
R
,I
N
D
,M
N
G
,
K
O
R
Y
es
12
m
on
th
s
ye
s
20
00
–
(.
..
)
W
ith
L
im
ita
tio
ns
N
ot
es
T
he
ta
bl
e
re
po
rt
s,
fo
r
W
es
te
rn
E
U
ho
st
co
un
tr
ie
s,
se
le
ct
ed
as
pe
ct
so
ft
he
ir
as
yl
um
po
lic
ie
s
C
ol
um
n
1
re
po
rt
st
he
lis
to
fc
ou
nt
ri
es
of
or
ig
in
st
ha
ta
re
co
ns
id
er
ed
to
be
sa
fe
C
ol
um
n
2
su
m
m
ar
iz
es
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
on
w
he
th
er
an
d
fo
r
ho
w
lo
ng
as
yl
um
se
ek
er
s
ar
e
de
ni
ed
ac
ce
ss
to
th
e
la
bo
ur
m
ar
ke
tw
hi
le
de
ci
sio
ns
on
th
ei
r
ap
pl
ic
at
io
ns
ar
e
pe
nd
in
g
C
ol
um
n
3
do
cu
m
en
ts
w
he
th
er
an
d
fo
r
ho
w
lo
ng
a
di
sp
er
sa
lp
ol
ic
y
is
or
ha
sb
ee
n
in
pl
ac
e
C
ol
um
n
4
de
sc
ri
be
sw
he
th
er
or
no
ta
sy
lu
m
se
ek
er
s
ha
ve
ef
fe
ct
iv
e
ac
ce
ss
to
he
al
th
ca
re
*(
¼
sa
fe
on
ly
fo
r
m
al
es
)
18
ensure that asylum seekers access the labour market no later than 9months after they
apply for protection. This ban, however, is for only 1month in Portugal; 3months in
Austria, Finland, and Germany, 6months in Belgium, Italy, Netherlands and Spain, but
one year in France and the UK.
Over the last few decades, European countries have also experimented with asylum
seeker dispersal policies aimed generally at distributing the inflows of potential refugees
across different regions of the receiving countries, usually away from major cities.
Sweden, for example, introduced an ‘all-of-Sweden’ policy in 1984 that remained com-
pulsory until 1994 (Edin et al., 2003). Denmark similarly implemented a dispersal policy
between 1986 and 1998 (Damm, 2009), and in 1987 and 1994, respectively, the
Netherlands and Norway introduced dispersal policies that still remain in place today.
The UK and Ireland also continue to disperse asylum seekers under policies introduced
in 2000 (Bell et al., 2013). At the same time, according to AIDA12 survey data, only
Belgium, Italy and Ireland fully guarantee asylum seekers adequate access to healthcare:
in all other countries, they enjoy only limited access.
3. THE CURRENT EUROPEAN REFUGEE CRISIS
3.1. Entry routes
According to Frontex, which records detected attempts since 2009, over 2.6 million ille-
gal migration attempts were detected at European borders between 2009 and 2015,
with 1.8 million in 2015 alone.13 Frontex distinguishes nine routes of entry into Europe:
(1) the central Mediterranean route (i.e. flows from North Africa towards Italy and
Malta through the Mediterranean Sea); (2) the circular route from Albania to Greece;
(3) the eastern border route (i.e. the 6,000 km long land border between Belarus,
Moldova, Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the EU’s eastern Member States);
(4 and 5) the Eastern Mediterranean sea and land routes (i.e. crossing through Turkey
to the EU via Greece, southern Bulgaria or Cyprus); (6) the Western African route
(mainly from Senegal and Mauritania to the Canary Islands); (7 and 8) the western
Mediterranean sea and land routes (from North Africa to the Iberian Peninsula); and (9)
the Western Balkan route (i.e. flows from the Western Balkan countries themselves and
crossings through the Bulgarian Turkish or Greek Turkish borders directed towards
Hungary).
Figure 6 outlines the numbers of illegal border crossings recorded by Frontex over
time while also highlighting the share of crossings through each of the three routes that
12 The European Council on Refugees’ Asylum Information Database (AIDA).
13 Illegal crossings are defined as ‘the number of third country nationals detected by Member State au
thorities when entering or attempting to enter illegally the territory between border crossing points at
external borders’. See Data Appendix A.2 for a discussion of the limitations of these data.
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have become the most important in the current crisis: the Central Mediterranean route,
the Eastern Mediterranean sea route and the Western Balkan route. The number of at-
tempted illegal crossings rose dramatically between 2014 and 2015. The share of total
crossings along the Central Mediterranean route was especially large in 2014 (about
60% of total crossings), while the Eastern Mediterranean sea and Western Balkan routes
together accounted for 90% of illegal crossing attempts in 2015.
3.2. Source countries
As regards origin country, over the entire 2009 2015 period, Syrian citizens, at
about 38% of the total, constituted the largest group attempting illegal crossings,
with the over 500 thousand Afghans making up an additional 20% (see panel A,
Table 5).14 Iraqis, Pakistanis, Albanians and Eritreans each accounted for 4 to 5% of
total crossings, while those coming from Kosovo, Somalia, Nigeria and Bangladesh
made up about 2%. As illustrated by the ratio of illegal crossing attempts in 2015 to
those in 2009 (column 4), over the 7 years covered by our data, the relative magni-
tude of inflows from each of these countries varied drastically, and total illegal
Figure 6. Illegal border crossings in Europe by route (2009–2015)
Notes: The solid line and right axis represent the annual number of detected illegal border crossings (in millions)
into the EU between 1980 and 2015; the vertical bars report the share of total crossings in each year detected on
the Western Balkan route (red), Eastern Mediterranean sea route (green), Central Mediterranean route (yellow)
and other routes (blue).
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Frontex data.
14 Because information on origin country is unavailable for 14% of total crossings in Q3 2015 and 48%
of total crossings in Q4 2015, for these two quarters, we impute unknown nationalities based on the
route specific origin country composition in the previous quarter.
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crossing attempts grew 17-fold. Nonetheless, expansions were not equally distributed
across countries; for instance, unauthorized migration attempts from Syria acceler-
ated dramatically from barely any in 2009 to 1.4 thousand times the number in
2015. Conversely, the number of illegal crossings attempted by Albanian citizens in
2015 was only one-third of its 2009 size.
Panel B of Table 5 shows that between 2009 and 2015, over 3.5 million asylum appli-
cations were submitted in Europe, with the number increasing nearly fivefold over the
period. The top 10 countries of origin for asylum applicants largely overlap with those
of illegal crossers, with 9 out of 10 countries being in both lists. Syria and Afghanistan
particularly, the two countries that account for the greatest number of attempted illegal
Table 5. Illegal border crossings and asylum applications in Europe, 2009–2015
Panel A: Illegal crossings to Europe, 2009 2015
Origin Detected attempts Share of total attempts (%) Ratio 2015/2009
Syria 992,864 37.7 1,430.92
Afghanistan 529,595 20.1 28.98
Iraq 134,029 5.1 28.95
Pakistan 131,350 5.0 60.67
Albania 111,660 4.2 0.27
Eritrea 95,687 3.6 18.83
Kosovo 57,544 2.2 35.80
Somalia 54,451 2.1 2.12
Nigeria 48,491 1.8 14.41
Bangladesh 44,331 1.7 47.60
Total 2,633,896 17.41
Panel B: Asylum applications in Europe, 2009 2015
Origin Applications Share of total applications (%) Ratio 2015/2009
Syria 595,869 16.9 77.33
Afghanistan 360,542 10.2 8.10
Serbia and Kosovo 271,235 7.7 4.57
Iraq 214,471 6.1 6.51
Eritrea 151,754 4.3 4.95
Russian Federation 145,634 4.1 0.94
Pakistan 143,284 4.1 4.77
Somalia 126,815 3.6 1.00
Nigeria 108,889 3.1 2.51
Albania 107,817 3.1 32.91
Total 3,522,378 4.74
Notes: Panel A reports, for Europe as a whole, the number of detected illegal crossings of European borders be
tween 2009 and 2015 separately for each of the ten main origin countries, the share of nationals from each origin
country among total illegal crossings, the ratio of detected crossings in 2015 to detected crossings in 2009 and the
number of years each country has been among the top ten origin countries in the period 2009 2015.
Source: Our elaboration on Frontex data.
Panel B reports separately for each of the ten main origin countries the number of asylum applications ﬁled in
Europe between 2009 and 2015, the share of nationals from each origin country among total asylum applications,
the ratio of applications in 2015 to applications in 2009 and the number of years each country has been among
the top ten origin countries of applicants in the period 2009 2015.
Source: Own calculations on UNHCR data.
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border crossings, are also the top two countries of origin for asylum applicants and were
responsible for the largest increase in asylum applications (by a factor of 77 and 8, re-
spectively). The exceptions are Russia, which is only present among countries of origin
for asylum applicants, and Bangladesh, which is not among the top ten countries of ori-
gin of asylum applicants.
3.3. Destinations
As already emphasized, not all European countries (EU28þNORþCHE) have been
equally affected by the refugee crisis. As Table 6 shows, between 2009 and 2015,
Western European countries received the largest share (3.1 million) of the total 3.5 mil-
lion asylum applications (almost 70 per 10,000 population) received by all European
countries.15 These aggregate figures, however, conceal the true heterogeneity of refugee
populations across Western European countries. As Table 6 shows, over the 2009 2015
period, the top five recipients of asylum applications were Germany (902 thousand;
110.1 per 10,000 pop.), Sweden (414 thousand; 446.9 per 10,000 pop.), France (390
thousand; 60.5 per 10,000 pop.), Italy (256 thousand, 43.5 per 10,000 pop) and
Hungary (244 thousand; 243.8 per 10,000 pop.).
Figure 7 illustrates the relation between the total asylum applications received by each
country between 2009 and 2015 (vertical axis) and its population of individuals with refu-
gee status in 2009 (horizontal axis). The straight line is the equality line. The figure shows
that the vast majority of European countries with the only exception being the UK lie
above the equality line, implying that the number of applications received over the 2009
2015 period was larger than the accumulated stock of refugees hosted in 2009. The scat-
ter plot further reveals that countries that started with a larger population of refugees in
2009 attracted more asylum applicants in the following years.
As a matter of fact, the burden imposed on Europe by this inflow of asylum seekers is
small compared to that placed on countries closer to the refugees’ countries of origin.
This difference is clearly demonstrated in Table 7, which reports refugee stocks and
their ratios to 10,000 population in both selected EU countries and Syria’s neighbouring
countries in 2014 (the last year for which complete data are available for all countries).
At that time, Lebanon, a country with a population of 4.5 million, was hosting 1.16 mil-
lion refugees, or about 2,554 individuals in search of humanitarian protection per
10,000 population. Likewise, Jordan was home to more than 1,000 refugees per 10,000
population, while Turkey was hosting nearly 1.7 million or 221 per 10,000 population.
By comparison, Sweden, the EU country with the highest population of individuals with
15 Note that the figures refer to the number of applications, not the number of individuals filing an ap
plication. Since individuals may be filing multiple applications, the number of applications is an upper
bound for the actual size of the flow of asylum seekers over the period.
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full GCR or subsidiary status relative to its size, was hosting 206 asylum seekers or indi-
viduals with refugee status per 10,000 population. The ratio for Norway and
Switzerland was just above 100 per 10,000 population, and for Germany and France, it
was only 55 and 47, respectively.
Table 6. Total asylum applications in Europe between 2009 and 2015 by
host country
Host country Total asylum application 2009 2015
thousands per 10,000 pop
Germany 902.7 110.1
Sweden 413.6 446.9
France 389.5 60.5
Italy 256.7 43.5
Hungary 244.5 243.8
United Kingdom 204.1 32.9
Austria 186.9 224.2
Switzerland 151.7 196.9
Belgium 147.2 136.9
Netherlands 127.4 77.3
Norway 98.7 205.7
Greece 73.1 65.8
Denmark 61.2 111.1
Poland 60.9 16.0
Finland 53.6 100.7
Bulgaria 41.3 55.3
Spain 34.2 7.4
Cyprus 14.0 175.5
Ireland 11.7 25.8
Malta 11.3 274.7
Romania 9.6 4.7
Luxembourg 9.1 184.7
Czech Republic 4.8 4.6
Croatia 3.8 8.7
Slovak Republic 2.8 5.3
Lithuania 2.3 7.1
Portugal 2.2 2.1
Slovenia 1.5 7.5
Latvia 1.4 6.4
Estonia 0.5 3.7
EU15 þ NOR þ CHE 3123.7 76.5
EU28 þ NOR þ CHE 3522.4 68.5
Notes: The table reports for each EU host country (plus Norway and Switzerland) the total number, and the num
ber per 10,000 population, of asylum applications received between 2009 and 2015 (in thousand). It also reports
the stock of individuals with refugee status (full or subsidiary) living in the country in 2009 (in thousand), overall
and per 10,000 population.
Source: Own calculations based on UNHCR data.
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4. REFUGEE LABOUR MARKET INTEGRATION
4.1. Evidence from past refugee waves
To assess how well past refugees to EU countries have integrated into the labour market
compared to economic immigrants from the same area of origin we draw on the 2008
wave of the European Labour Force Survey (EULFS) that allows us to differentiate be-
tween economic and refugee migrants.16 We focus on individuals in working age (be-
tween 25 and 64 years old), not in full education or military service, and define
‘refugees’ the migrants who report ‘international protection’ as the reason for migration
(see Data Appendix A.3 for details).
Table 8 gives an initial overview of the socio-economic characteristics of refugees
compared to those of natives and economic immigrants from EU15 and non-EU15
countries. The refugees are 61% male, versus 47% for economic immigrants, and
43.9 years old on average, which is slightly older than economic immigrants but under a
year younger than natives. They are on average somewhat less educated than natives
Figure 7. Total asylum applications received between 2009 and 2015 and refugee
population in 2009 by host country
Notes: The horizontal axis displays the 2009 stock of individuals with refugee status (full or subsidiary) per 10,000
population for all EU countries (plus Norway and Switzerland); the vertical axis shows the cumulated number of
asylum applications between 2009 and 2015 per 10,000 population. The straight line is the equality line above
which countries were receiving a higher number of applications than their 2009 refugee stock.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UNHCR data.
16 At the time this paper was written, this is the only available wave in the EULFS that provides that
type of information.
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and economic immigrants from EU15 countries, but they are better educated than eco-
nomic immigrants from non-EU15 countries.
To evaluate how refugee employment rates compare with those of economic immi-
grants and natives, in Figure 8, we graph unconditional and conditional (on age, gender
and educational attainment) employment rate differentials between natives and, respec-
tively, EU15 economic immigrants, non-EU15 economic immigrants and refugees over-
all.17 Although all immigrant types have lower employment probabilities than natives,
both conditionally and unconditionally, the employment gaps are larger for non-EU15
immigrants than for EU15 immigrants (3.2 versus 7.2 percentage points unconditional
on socio-economic characteristics) and increase to 16.1 percentage points for refugees.
Table 7. Refugees and asylum seekers as a share of population, 2014
Panel A: Middle Eastern countries
Refugees Country
population
Refugees per
10.000
population
Lebanon 1,161,439 4,546,774 2,554
Jordan 672,862 6,607,000 1,018
Turkey 1,693,686 76,667,864 221
Iraq 279,585 34,812,326 80
Panel B: EU Countries (plus Norway and Switzerland)
Stock of individuals
with refugee status
(full or subsidiary)
Asylum
seekers
Country
population
individuals with
refugee status þ
asylum seekers per
10,000 population
Sweden 142,152 56,717 9,644,864 206
Norway 46,980 7,094 5,107,970 106
Switzerland 62,566 20,762 8,139,631 102
France 252,228 55,814 65,889,148 47
Denmark 17,737 4,245 5,627,235 39
Germany 216,921 226,116 80,767,463 55
United Kingdom 117,093 36,294 64,351,155 24
Italy 93,662 45,675 60,782,668 23
Notes: Panel A reports the total number of refugees, the country’s population and the number of refugees per
10,000 population in selected Middle Eastern countries in 2014. Panel B displays the total number of individuals
with full Geneva or subsidiary refugee status, the total number of asylum applications, the country’s population
and the number of individuals with refugee status plus asylum seekers per 10,000 population in selected
European countries in 2014.
Source: Own calculations based on UNHCR data.
17 The estimates are from LPM regressions of an indicator equal to one if the individual is employed (or
self employed) on refugee, EU15 immigrant and non EU15 immigrant dummies, a set of individual
controls and country of residence fixed effects. These estimates are reported in Appendix Table A1.
We focus our analysis of refugees’ economic integration on employment status because wage data are
not available in EULFS data.
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Conditional employment gaps are even larger, reflecting the fact that refugees are dis-
proportionately male and young, both of which characteristics are positively associated
with a likelihood of employment. Figure 9 provides more detail on how the (conditional)
immigrant-native and refugee-native employment gaps differ by area of origin.18
Table 8. Basic characteristics of refugee population
Refugees Immigrants
non EU15
Immigrants
EU15
Natives
Share of males 0.61 0.47 0.47 0.50
Mean age 43.9 41.2 42.6 44.7
Share with lower secondary education 0.38 0.44 0.27 0.32
Share with tertiary education 0.23 0.22 0.28 0.26
Number of observations 2,554 33,370 440,594
Notes: The table compares socio economic characteristics of refugee migrants (who entered the country because of
international protection), economic migrants from EU15 and non EU15 countries and natives. The sample in
cludes all individuals aged between 26 and 64, not in education or military service.
Source: Own calculations based on the EULFS, 2008; EULFS 2008.
Figure 8. Refugee-native and immigrant-native employment gaps
Notes: The ﬁgure shows the unconditional and conditional differences in employment probabilities between EU15
and non EU15 economic immigrants and natives, as well as between refugees and natives obtained using linear
probability models. All regressions include host country ﬁxed effects. Conditional employment gaps control for
gender, age (dummy variables for 5 year age groups) and education (dummy variables for lower secondary and
tertiary education). The sample includes all individuals aged between 25 and 64 not in full time education or mili
tary service. We also report 90% conﬁdence intervals based on robust standard errors.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EULFS 2008 data.
18 The estimates are from LPM regressions of an indicator equal to one if the individual is employed (or
self employed) on refugee and immigrant dummies, a set of individual controls and country fixed ef
fect, with separate regressions estimated for each area of origin. Information about the country of ori
gin is not available. These estimates are reported in Appendix Table A2.
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Whereas refugees and economic immigrants from European countries outside EU15
(NMS12 and Other European in the Figure) show similar conditional employment gaps
to natives, refugees from North Africa, the Middle East or other African and Asian
countries are considerably less likely to be employed than economic immigrants from
the same areas of origin. Employment gaps are largest for the group of refugees from
North Africa and the Middle East, at 32.5 percentage points.
To assess how quickly refugees integrate into their host countries vis-a-vis economic
immigrants, in Figure 10 we plot the conditional refugee-native and immigrant-native
employment rate differentials against years since arrival. As expected, the employment
probabilities of both refugees and economic immigrants increase with years in the coun-
try; however, the increase is far steeper for refugees. During the first three years of arri-
val, refugees are 50 percentage points less likely to be employed than natives, a large
gap that may be explainable by the legal restrictions on labour market participation fre-
quently in place during the application processing period. This refugee-native employ-
ment gap declines by about half 7 to 10 years after arrival, turns statistically insignificant
15 to 19 years after arrival and eventually approaches zero 25 years after arrival. While
the figure suggests that employment prospects of refugees improve more rapidly than
those of immigrants with time in the country, it is important to bear in mind that the
Figure 9. Employment gaps by area of origin
Notes: The ﬁgure displays the differences in employment probabilities between economic immigrants and natives
and between refugees and natives by area of origin obtained using linear probability models estimated separately
for each origin area. The regressions control for gender, age (dummy variables for 5 year age groups), education
(dummy variables for lower secondary and tertiary education) and host country ﬁxed effects. We also report 90%
conﬁdence intervals based on robust standard errors. The sample includes all individuals aged between 25 and 64
not in full time education or military service but excludes economic immigrants from EU15 countries. NMS12 in
cludes all countries that entered the EU in 2004 and 2007: Malta, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EULFS 2008.
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figure is based on one cross-section only, precluding us from separating the effects of
years since arrival from possible compositional changes across cohorts. This catch-up of
refugees is in line with evidence presented by Aiyar et al (2016) who, similar to us, focus
on Europe as a whole. Luik et al. (2016) and Cortes (2004) document a similar catch-up
of refugees in Sweden and the United States. Bratsberg et al. (2014, 2016), in contrast,
paint a more negative picture in the case of Norway, highlighting that refugees become
increasingly dependent on social insurance transfers.19
Table 9 highlights that the lower employment probabilities of refugees versus
immigrants cannot be accounted for by differences in area of origin or years since arri-
val.20 Conditional on individual characteristics and destination country fixed effects, ref-
ugees are 10.9 percentage points less likely to be employed than economic (non-EU15)
immigrants. This gap decreases only slightly to 0.095 percentage points when area of
Figure 10. Employment gaps by years since arrival
Notes: The ﬁgure displays gaps (together with 90% conﬁdence intervals) in the employment probabilities of eco
nomic immigrants versus natives and refugees versus natives by years since arrival obtained from linear probabil
ity models that condition on gender, age (dummy variables for 5 year age groups), education (dummy variables
for lower secondary and tertiary education) and host country ﬁxed effects. The sample includes individuals aged
between 25 and 64 not in full time education or military service.
19 Bevelander and Pendakur (2014) find that in Canada refugees, especially women, tend to be more
successful than family reunion immigrants.
20 In column (1), we regress the employment indicator on an indicator for being a refugee, an indicator
for being foreign born (which equals 1 for both immigrants and refugees, and 0 for natives) as well as
on individual characteristics and country of residence fixed effects. We then include a full set of inter
actions between the foreign born indicator and indicators denoting years since arrival (column 2), be
tween the foreign born indicator and indicators of area of origin (column 3) and between the foreign
born indicator and indicators of both years since arrival and area of origin ones (column 4). In this
specification, the coefficient on the refugee indicator refers the mean difference in the employment
probabilities of refugees and non EU15 immigrants within each year since arrival (in column 2),
within each area of origin (in column 3) or both (in column 4).
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origin fixed effects and years since arrival are included as additional regressors.
Compositional differences in terms of years since arrival and areas of origin are, there-
fore, responsible for only a relatively small portion (13%) of the observed employment
gap between refugees and non-EU15 immigrants.
Figure 11 further reveals that the refugee-native employment gaps (conditional on in-
dividual characteristics) vary widely across destination countries, much more so than the
economic immigrant-native employment gaps. The two countries with the largest
refugee-native employment gaps are Ireland and the UK (with 46 and 29 percentage
points, respectively), both nations in which economic immigrants do particularly well.21
Countries with a relatively large refugee share, such as Sweden, Germany and Austria,
take a middle position with employment gaps of 23, 17 and 9 percentage points, respec-
tively. Finally, employment gaps between natives and both refugees and economic immi-
grants are small in Cyprus and Greece, as well as in Italy, Spain and Portugal, all
countries with relatively low shares of refugees.
4.2. Outlook: the current refugee crisis
How well current refugees will integrate into the labour market is extremely difficult to
forecast for at least two reasons. First, comprehensive and representative data on the skill
Table 9. Refugee-Immigrant (non-EU15) employment gap
Baseline Conditional on
years since arrival
Conditional on
area of origin
Conditional
on both
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Refugee immigrant gap 0.109*** 0.121*** 0.083*** 0.095***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Years since arrival FE X X
Area of origin FE X X
Observations 468,404 468,404 468,404 468,404
R2 0.216 0.216 0.217 0.218
Notes: We regress the usual employment indicator on an indicator for refugee, a foreign born one (which equals 1
for both immigrants and refugees, and 0 for natives) as well as the usual individual characteristics (age dummies,
gender, education dummies) and country of residence ﬁxed effects. We then, from column 2 onward include the
refugee indicator and a full set of interactions between the foreign born indicator and years since arrival ones (col
umn 2), between the foreign born indicator and area of origin ones (column 3) and between the foreign born indi
cator and both years and area of origin ones (column 4). With such a speciﬁcation, the coefﬁcient on refugee
(reported in the table) delivers the mean difference between employment probability of refugees and non EU15
immigrants within each value of year since arrival (in column 2) and within each area of origin (in column 3) or
within both (in column 4). Sample: individuals aged between 25 and 64, not in education or military service.
Immigrants from EU15 or North America are excluded. Robust standard errors in brackets.
***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.1.
21 Despite such heterogeneity, estimates from the pooled sample of all countries are not driven by any
single country. Table A3. reports estimates from pooled regressions where we drop at a time each of
the countries in our sample. The immigrant and refugee coefficients remain highly significant and are
of similar magnitude across all specifications.
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structure and employability of those currently applying for asylum, or of those whose ap-
plication was approved no more than two years ago, does not yet exist. Second, their
labour market outcomes depend on which policies, integration support and incentive
structures are implemented.
As Figure 9 shows, existing refugee populations in EU Member States who arrived
many years before the current crisis, but who are from the same areas as the major share
of current asylum seekers (i.e. North Africa and the Middle East), are considerably less
likely to be employed than refugees from other areas, even conditional on their educa-
tional background.
A recent survey by the German Ministry for Immigration and Refugees conducted in
2014, which focuses on individuals given official refugee status who initially applied for
asylum in Germany between 2007 and 2012 and thus arrived at the onset of the crisis, fur-
ther indicates that refugees from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan are less educated than refu-
gees who arrived in previous waves. Specifically, as Table 10 shows, 16.1% of Syrian and
25.9% of Iraqi refugees have never attended school, and only 4.3 and 3.5% have attended
school for at least 15 years (which is comparable to tertiary education in Table 8). The ta-
ble further shows that only 38.9% of Iraqi and 24.7% of Syrian refugees are employed (of
Figure 11. Employment rate differentials by host country
Notes: The ﬁgure plots employment rate differentials (and 90% conﬁdence intervals) between economic immi
grants and natives as well as between refugee migrants and natives separately by host country, obtained from lin
ear probability models estimated separately for each country that condition on gender, age (dummy variables for
5 year age groups) and education (dummy variables for lower secondary and tertiary education). Due to the low
number of refugees in some countries, Italy, Spain and Portugal (It Es Pt) are grouped together, as are Cyprus
and Greece (Cy Gr). The sample includes all individuals aged between 25 and 64 not in full time education or
military service.
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which roughly one third are employed only marginally for under 10h a week), while one-
fifth to one quarter are looking for work (see Worbs and Bund, 2016, for more details).
Focusing on refugees who applied for asylum in Germany in 2015, a survey con-
ducted by the German Ministry for Immigration and Refugees at the time of registra-
tion paints a somewhat more optimistic picture and puts the share of asylum applicants
with tertiary education at 17% and the share of applicants who never attended school at
8%. These numbers may, however, not be fully representative as only 70% of asylum
applicants agreed to participate in the survey.
5. THE ECONOMICS OF REFUGEE MIGRATION
We begin our discussion on the economics of refugee migration by highlighting the im-
portant differences between refugee and economic migrants (Section 5.1.). We then dis-
cuss the trade-offs and policy options faced by single countries (Section 5.2.) before
outlining the economic advantages of coordinated decisions between countries; for ex-
ample, at the EU level (Section 5.3.).
5.1. Refugee versus economic migrants
Economic migrants are, at least conceptually, fundamentally different from refugee mi-
grants in that the former not only choose whether or not to migrate, but also decide based
on the constraints set by receiving countries, which country to migrate to given the eco-
nomic benefits of this decision. Refugee migrants, in contrast, are forced to leave their ori-
gin countries, often due to unforeseen and sudden events that put their lives at risk. Their
migration decisions, therefore, are generally neither deliberate nor planned, and less based
on economic considerations. Their arrival in a host country is often dictated by contin-
gency, after perilous and unpredictable journeys. Similarly, receiving countries typically
choose economic migrants based on economic considerations (e.g. labour market short-
ages) and they can set clear migration terms, such as stay duration and migrant
Table 10. Educational attainment and employment probabilities of recent refu-
gees in Germany
School attendance Labour market participation
None up to
9 years
10 14
years
at least
15 years
employed looking
for work
out of the
labour force
in training
Afghanistan 18.3 27.8 48.9 2.8 29.1 20.7 19.9 16.3
Iraq 25.9 41.4 25.7 3.5 38.9 21.5 26 6
Syria 16.1 35.5 41.5 4.3 24.7 26.4 27.8 6.9
N 2,403 2,805
Notes: The table summarizes results from a recent survey conducted by the German Ministry for Immigration and
Refugees in 2014, which focuses on individuals who obtained ofﬁcial refugee status and who initially applied for
asylum in Germany between 2007 and 2012.
Source: Worbs and Bund (2016), table 2 and ﬁgure 4.
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qualifications. In the case of refugee migration, however, countries are fulfilling their obli-
gations as GCR signatories, and the decision to grant asylum seekers official refugee status
is primarily based on humanitarian considerations. As such, receiving countries may have
relatively little influence on the type of refugees they host. Refugee migrations are, there-
fore, closer to ‘forced marriage’ than the ‘chosen match’ typical in economic migrations
and the relation between the two parties, migrant and destination country, is different
from what would have evolved if all decisions had been taken on purely economic
grounds. This is not to say that the forced marriage is necessarily inferior to the optimally
chosen match for both parties. On the contrary, forced emigration may well mean that
destination countries are able to attract migrants with qualifications and economic poten-
tial that they might otherwise not have enticed to settle in their countries.22 Cases also ex-
ist, however, of less well-endowed refugee populations where the economic benefit to the
receiving country is less clear see our discussion in the previous section.
5.2. Country-specific policies and trade-offs
5.2.1. Permanent settlement or temporary protection? Even though destination
countries have limited control over the number and type of displaced migrants arriving
in their territory, they can decide whether to grant full GCR refugee status or offer sub-
sidiary forms of humanitarian protection that require refugees to repatriate once the
conflict or migration trigger has been eliminated. For instance, whereas in the 1990s,
most destination countries opted for some form of temporary protection for the refugee
waves from Bosnia and Kosovo, the choices made during the current refugee crisis differ
widely (see Table 3). Many of the former Yugoslavia refugees returned to their home
country once the conflict ended. For example, of the 345,000 refugees from Bosnia
Herzegovina residing in Germany in 1996, 260,000 had voluntarily returned by
December 2000, while 5,500 were deported against their will (Ru¨hl and Lederer, 2001).
In the current crisis, not only is there considerably more uncertainty about whether and
when the primary impetuses for asylum seeking will abate, but current refugees are cul-
turally more distinct than the Balkan refugees and, based on initial evidence, may also
be less educated (see Section 4.2.).
Two primary reasons for the poor success in integrating refugees into the host coun-
tries’ labour markets are the long decision time for asylum claims and the indecisiveness
of host nations about duration and permanence of stay. Both factors contribute to con-
siderable delays in giving individuals a clear perspective on their future residence in the
22 Historical incidences of the gains to countries giving refuge to persecuted populations include the
17th century re population and boost to the textile industry in war torn Prussia induced by
Huguenots fleeing religious persecution in France (see Hornung, 2014) and the major contributions
to science and technology in the United States made by highly educated Jews fleeing Nazi Germany
(see e.g. Moser et al., 2014).
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host country. This lack of clear timeframe speaks to the key insight from early dynamic
models of human capital (e.g. Ben-Porath, 1967) that the longer the pay-off period for
skill investment, the more individuals invest, which is why full time schooling takes place
at the start rather than in the middle or towards the end of an individuals’ life cycle.
Applied to migrants, because the type of human capital that is productive differs across
nations, migrants must learn new skills that make them productive in their new country
of residence. One such skill is knowledge of the local language, whose acquisition is very
costly but of dubious value in the origin country. Consequently, as emphasized by
Dustmann (1993, 1999, 2000), whether and how much a migrant chooses to invest into
country-specific human capital depends greatly on the migrant’s perception of the likeli-
hood of future settlement in the host country. Being unclear about the chances of per-
manent stay creates disincentives for investment into the types of skills that are
productive in the new country, affecting the refugees’ earnings and career paths and
leading them to perform below their economic potential.23 Lack of clarity about the pos-
sibility of permanent settlement thus obstructs attempts to use such schemes to train ref-
ugees. Even if permanent residence is guaranteed but only after a prolonged period in
the host country, such investment may no longer seem optimal because of the reduced
pay-off period. Adda et al. (2016) find strong support for this hypothesis, by estimating a
dynamic model of return migration and human capital accumulation, and simulating
the effects of lack of clarity about permanence at the start of an individual’s migration
cycle on lifetime earnings and human capital investments.
These observations have important consequences for the politics of refugee migration.
Above all, policies aimed at fostering labour market integration and optimizing mi-
grants’ economic contribution need to recognize that these individuals will only under-
take costly investments in host country-specific human capital if they are likely to pay-off
over the life cycle. Moreover, because certification requirements and the transferability
of certain aspects of such capital differ across countries, any such policies need to be
carefully adapted to the particularities of the host country.24 As a result of the above cir-
cumstances, refugees who are initially offered only temporary protection but end up
staying for long periods may have lower employment probabilities and lower earnings
than refugees offered permanent settlement from the start. This observation calls for
23 For example, Germany’s comprehensive system of skill certifications obtained through 2 3 year trade
apprenticeships is costly because remuneration during the long training period is far lower than the
wage in an equivalent unskilled job (see Dustmann and Schoenberg, 2012, for details). Moreover, the
certification, although valuable in Germany, may be worth little in the refugee’s country of origin.
Consequently, even young refugees are likely to be reluctant to undertake prolonged and costly train
ing within the apprenticeship system unless they see their future in the Germany.
24 For instance, whereas certificates are an essential part of German workers’ careers, such is less the
case for UK workers. On the other hand, English may be more valuable in the home country than
German. All else being equal, both these aspects support the economic integration of refugees into
the UK rather than Germany.
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shorter periods for deciding asylum claims25 and for policies that provide clear host
country commitment on residence duration. Such policies should be combined with
carefully designed active integration programs for those who obtain full refugee status or
permanent residency.26 The refugees’ own investments could be further incentivized by
making economic success in the labour market a pre-condition or contingency in the se-
lection for permanent residence. In fact, Germany adopted such a policy in the
1990s for refugees from Bosnia and Kosovo (see, e.g. Ru¨hl and Lederer, 2001; Ru¨hl
et al., 2004).
5.2.2. Where should refugees be allocated? In addition to choosing between per-
manent and temporary protection, destination countries must decide on refugee loca-
tion, which economic efficiency dictates should be in areas with the lowest hosting costs
but highest chances of integration into the labour market. Such areas tend to be urban
areas already containing immigrants from the refugees’ own country, who can then
serve as a support network and actively help their newly arrived compatriots to find
decent-paying jobs (Edin et al., 2003; Damm, 2009). For the same reasons, refugees also
typically prefer areas with a larger concentration of their own nationals, meaning that al-
lowing refugees free choice over where to locate within the destination country may lead
to superior labour market outcomes.
Another important consideration is the political costs of refugee allocation. Recent re-
search by Dustmann et al. (2016) suggests that the political costs may likewise be smaller in
urban than in rural areas: they find that the inflow of refugee migrants increases the sup-
port for right-wing anti-immigration parties in rural areas, but not urban areas. On the
other hand, housing costs are typically considerably higher in urban than in rural areas.
5.3. Economic advantages of coordinated decisions between countries
Increased coordination between countries for example, at the EU level could have
several economic benefits for receiving countries that are separately discussed below.
5.3.1. Refugee status as a public good. Offering refugee status is a public good in
that if one country offers asylum to those escaping individual persecution or civil war, resi-
dents in other countries benefit from knowing that these individuals are safe. However,
the fact that the costs of hosting the refugees are borne entirely by the country providing
asylum leads to an under-provision of the public good when countries make such decisions
individually. Coordination between countries would make it possible to internalize the
25 Hainmueller et al. (2016) provide evidence that the length of time that refugees wait for a decision on
their asylum claim affects their subsequent economic integration.
26 Couttenier et al. (2016) provide evidence that integration policies, including swift access to the labour
market, can mitigate immigrants’ likelihood to commit a crime.
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externalities that countries impose on each other, allowing the social optimum to be
reached (see Hatton, 2004, 2015; Hatton and Williamson, 2006, for a formal analysis).27
Dynamically consistent decisions: A lack of coordination may induce countries to
make decisions that are not dynamically consistent. For example, governments may de-
ter applications for asylum by adopting specific policies, such as limiting asylum seekers’
access to the labour or housing markets, implementing an especially lengthy application
process or failing to provide an active integration program for successful applicants.
These polices, as previously pointed out, can increase a destination country’s cost of ref-
ugee hosting by hindering the integration of successful applicants. If, however, countries
cooperate, they no longer have any incentive to adopt such harmful policies.
5.3.2. Allocating a given number of refugees at the lowest possible cost.
As shown by Fernandez-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport (2015a,b), cooperation across
nations makes it possible to allocate a given number of refugees at minimum costs while
simultaneously ensuring that the burden (or responsibility) of providing refuge is shared
by all countries. Supposing that countries have not only agreed on the total number of
refugees to be admitted, but also on a refugee quota system (based, e.g. on country pop-
ulation size and GDP),28 then, ignoring for the moment any match effects whereby cer-
tain types of refugees can best integrate in a particular country, these countries will
differ with respect to their (marginal) costs of providing refugee. Here, we interpret
‘costs’ in the broad sense, reflecting not only monetary costs but also the country’s gen-
eral willingness to welcome refugees. A market in which countries are allowed to trade
refugee quotas will secure the allocation of refugees across countries at minimum costs.
To illustrate this consider two countries, A and B, that initially agree to accept 1,000 ref-
ugees each. If the cost of hosting an additional refugee is e20,000 for country A but only
e10,000 for country B, then there is room for trade. For example, country B might ad-
mit an additional refugee if paid at least e10,000, while country A might be willing to
pay up to e20,000 for not having to provide refuge to the 1,000th refugee. The gains
from the trade will be exhausted once the marginal costs of hosting an additional refugee
are equalized between the two countries, resulting in a refugee allocation that minimizes
the costs of granting asylum and allows both countries to contribute to the costs accord-
ing to a prearranged quota.29 As argued by Fernandez-Huertas Moraga and Rapoport
(2015b), this mechanism may be augmented by a matching algorithm that allows
27 Facchini et al. (2006) develop a political economy model to study the process through which countries
determine their asylum policies. They show that coordination is desirable, but allowing for cross
country transfers towards countries that receive larger numbers of asylum seekers may lead to a wel
fare inferior outcome because the possibility of compensation exacerbates strategic delegation effects.
28 Several such quota systems have been proposed in the past; see, for example, Fernandez Huertas
Moraga and Rapoport (2015a) for an overview.
29 It should be noted that only a market mechanism can induce countries to truthfully reveal their costs
of hosting refugees: when countries implement quotas dependent on costs, they have an incentive to
overstate them.
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refugees to state their preferences for country of residence so as to realize match-specific
gains between refugee and host country.
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we provide a comprehensive overview of the existing regulatory frame-
works for refugee migration, the magnitudes and types of refugee movements and the
economics and politics of the current refugee crisis. In particular, we identify strong dif-
ferences in the way EU countries interpret their obligations as signatories of the GCR
and outline previous (mostly unsuccessful) attempts to enhance coordination at the EU
level. We also demonstrate that although asylum claims in the EU are currently at an
all-time high (1.5 million in 2015), applications are far from equally distributed across
EU countries and only about 10% submitted to EU15 countries (plus Norway and
Switzerland) between 2000 and 2014 were successful. We further document that previ-
ous waves of refugee migrants have been less successful in integrating into European la-
bour markets than economic migrants from the same origin areas. We also offer
tentative evidence that the labour market outcomes of the current waves of refugees will
be similarly problematic unless better integration mechanisms are implemented.
In our view, the above evidence calls for a strong, coordinated policy response to the
current crisis, which has imposed on Europe the tremendous costs of large-scale move-
ments of people who arrive unexpectedly and are given current regulations and their
common interpretations hard to control using conventional border protection means.
These movements pose an enormous challenge to European countries and to the funda-
ments of the EU as a whole. Not only their economic costs, but also their political costs
threaten to create rifts between countries and furnish a welcome vehicle for populist
movements to enhance their vote shares.30 The current crisis further demonstrates that
the Dublin Convention is unworkable, as amply illustrated by Europe’s unpreparedness
for the number of refugees that have arrived at its southern borders. At the same time,
the burden on EU countries of large inflows of refugees has been unequally distributed,
and ex post re-allocation schemes to share this burden more equally have been impossible
to implement. Moreover, many of those who arrived in European Member States over
the past decade have migrated for economic reasons rather than because of valid claims
under the GCR. Hence, only a fraction is likely to attain some type of refugee status (see
Figure 5), which adds the problem of deporting unsuccessful asylum applicants.
Despite the challenges to coordinate policies, there is a drastic need for a new regula-
tory framework agreeable to all Member States that addresses the current and future
challenges of refugee migration and replaces dated coordination attempts like the
Dublin Convention with a more workable alternative. Such a framework should be
based on two pillars: a coordinated policy that secures Europe’s outer borders and deals
30 See e.g. Dustmann et al. (2016) for evidence.
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with asylum claims before refugees have (illegally) crossed into mainland Europe, and an
allocation mechanism that more equitably distributes the burden of refugee migrations
across countries yet is flexible enough to account for national particularities and political
circumstances.
On the first, a coordinated refugee policy should implement measures for deciding
asylum claims at the outer borders of the EU before refugees enter the EU mainland.
Such measures would need EU countries to agree in principle on exactly what consti-
tutes a valid refugee claim. In practice, they would also require the establishment of fa-
cilities able to deal with large numbers of refugees at the outskirts of the EU, and of EU
courts that decide within weeks on claims according to agreed rules and interpretations
of the GCR. On the second, once some form of refugee status has been granted, the ref-
ugee needs then to be allocated to a European country, possibly with the help of trad-
able refugee quotas, combined with ex ante agreed allocation mechanisms that could take
into account refugees’ preferences, and seek to reduce the economic and political costs
of refugee hosting. EU-level coordination that reduces the costs of refugee hosting could
benefit all EU countries, not only those currently hosting the lion’s share of asy-
lum seekers. Such a system, if successfully implemented, would also deter potential mi-
grants with no humanitarian reasons, and thereby reduce future flows, possibly quite
radically.
Admittedly, establishing such a policy and its corresponding structures would be tre-
mendously challenging. However, continued lack of ex ante coordination and absence of
agreed EU-wide rules when dealing with future challenges may be far more costly. The
demographic developments in Africa and the Middle East, and the potential for conflict
in these regions suggest that there will be similar challenges in the future. Canning et al.
(2015), in a World Bank report, estimate that the population of Africa, Europe’s south-
ern neighbour, will increase to 2.8 billion over the next 45 years, from 1.11 billion in
2013. Similar projections are provided by a recent (2015) UN report on the World
Population,31 which identifies Africa as the continent with the fastest growing popula-
tions over the next decades, while Europe’s populations are shrinking. This, in combina-
tion with sluggish economic development, climate change, unstable political leadership
and possibly continued conflict, will lead to increased migration pressures on Europe.32
Among the 20 countries ranked highest according to the 2016 Fragile States Index by
the Fund for Peace (used by the OECD in their Report on States of Fragility),33 17 are
located either in Africa (14) or in the Middle East (3), and often overlap with countries
31 https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Publications/Files/World Population 2015 Wallchart.pdf
32 Climate change induced phenomena such as desertification and scarcity of food is considered by
some as possible future driver of large flows of ‘climate refugees’, especially from the Sahel region of
Africa (see http://time.com/4024210/climate change migrants/).
33 See http://www.oecdilibrary.org/docserver/download/4315011e.pdf?expires 1469989086&id id&
accname guest&checksum BD6D76E71DCEE19C1258F41351FD4163 for the OECD report, and
http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/rankings 2016 for the index.
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with the highest population growth. Europe’s economic and political future will be se-
verely affected on how it manages future movements instigated by conflict, persecution
and deprivation. The current crisis is a wake-up call to develop the necessary institutions
and implement needed coordination to be prepared for future challenges.34
The current crisis calls also for foreign policies that are more responsible. The recent
and ongoing conflicts in the Middle East are the main reasons for the humanitarian di-
saster and the ensuing refugee flows we have witnessed over the past years.
Responsibility for interventions and policies that may have contributed to the current sit-
uation lies also with European countries.35 To prevent refugee movements in the future,
European foreign policy should learn from past experiences, and be aimed at avoiding
conflict and instability.
Discussion
Uwe Sunde
University of Munich
This paper provides a very timely perspective on the economics of refugee migration. It
describes the legal and institutional background of asylum and refugee status, gives an
up-to-date description of the current European refugee crisis and provides an economic
perspective on the issue, with a focus on the differences between economic and refugee
migration. The paper ends with a discussion of aspects related to labour market integra-
tion and settlement policies. The bottom line of the paper is a call for coordination of
refugee-related policies in Europe to overcome the challenges of the current crisis.
Overall, the paper provides an important contribution to the debate on how to deal
with the wave of refugees coming to Europe.
34 We should emphasize that we propose a coordinated system to deal with future refugee migrations. We
believe that economic migrations should be handled sovereignly by the different Member States.
35 For example, see a recent report of the UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee on the
role of the UK government and its former Prime Minister David Cameron in the Libyan conflict
(http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmfaff/119/11902.htm ). It states
that the UK and French led intervention in 2011, supported by the United States, ‘was not informed
by accurate intelligence’ and that by summer 2011 the ‘limited intervention to protect civilians had
drifted into an opportunist policy of regime change’. It let to ‘political and economic collapse, inter
militia and inter tribal warfare, humanitarian and migrant crises, widespread human rights violations,
. . .. . ... and the growth of ISIS in North Africa’. One conclusion of the report is that ‘former Prime
Minister David Cameron was ultimately responsible for the failure to develop a coherent Libya
strategy’.
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The paper poses several issues that deserve more research in the future. One of the
central points of the paper is the documentation of the heterogeneity in refugee policies
across Europe. This heterogeneity is partly rooted in the incompatibility of the reasons
for the current crisis which is caused by civil conflicts and the population-wide mobility
induced by these conflicts with the definition of a refugee in the GCR from 1951
which is based on a personalized concept of persecution faced by an individual. Since
individual persecution needs to be documented in each asylum application, there are
many degrees of freedom as to how the rules for the recognition of refugee status are
interpreted, how strict the rules for recognition are, for how long unrecognized asylum
seekers are kept in line with the non-refoulement rules, how strictly the rules are
enforced and so on. This naturally implies an issue for the reliability and comparability
of data, for instance, regarding the shares of those originally covered by the Geneva
Convention in each country, and regarding the approval rates and return rates.
An interesting finding in this context is that the efficiency of asylum policies, measured
by the clearing speed of asylum applications, does not appear to reveal a clear relation
with the total number of applications in the data provided by the UNHCR. This is dem-
onstrated in Figure 4 and points to an endogeneity of the approval policies. This graph
is slightly misleading, however, since it plots time averages against time averages and
thereby eliminates a lot of potentially interesting variation. This is illustrated by the cases
of Germany and the UK, which exhibit entirely different dynamics, see Figure 12.
While the UK used to receive a much higher number of applications than Germany
during the early 2000s, this has reversed in the recent past. Obviously, there are issues of
crowding dynamics and policy endogeneity that deserve to be studied in greater detail
than is possible here. The key issue, however, is that time averages might conceal impor-
tant dynamics in applications, decisions and possibly rejections.
An issue that is discussed in quite some detail refers to the fundamental difference
between refugee migration and economic migration. The authors draw the distinction
by implying that refugee migration constitutes a forced match whereas economic migra-
tion is the result of a deliberate and (potentially constrained) optimal choice. These dif-
ferences are relevant for country-specific policies and have important economic
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implications. For instance, the question of temporary versus permanent residence influ-
ences the incentives for investments, in particular into human capital. The authors indi-
cate that refugee allocation within host country might be overly restrictive in this context
and document the substantial heterogeneity in policies. They also point at the advan-
tages of coordinated asylum policies, in light of the interpretation of refugee status as a
public good.
The defining aspect of forced versus free migration appears somewhat extreme in this
context. In particular, it seems hard to defend that refugees do not make decisions
regarding migration, the timing of their flight, their destination country and their pre-
ferred location within the destination countries. Clearly, the choices are much more con-
strained than those of economic migrants, and the reasons for migrating differ. On the
other hand, the fact that there seem to be substantial responses to policy changes sug-
gests that this distinction might be overly restrictive.
An interesting example in this context is the ruling of the German Federal
Constitutional Court regarding the entitlements of asylum seekers for welfare benefits.36
On 20 June 2012, the court criticized the discrepancy between welfare entitlements of
German citizens and the benefits for asylum seekers and declared the large differences
(of up to 50%) incompatible with the constitution. In response to this ruling, the benefits
for asylum seekers had to be increased substantially. Figure 13 plots the monthly total
numbers of asylum applications in Europe over the period 2010 14. The data reveal
that the ruling constituted a trend break in the asylum applications in Germany. While
there is no clear pattern before the court ruling, the data show a very strong upward
trend in applications in Germany after the ruling not witnessed by any other country.
This seems to suggest that the match of refugees to a destination country is not fully ran-
dom. Refugee migration, and in particular the choice of the destination country,
appears to be motivated by similar factors as economic migration, even though probably
to a different extent.
This reinforces the authors’ call for better coordination and for a harmonization of
refugee policy within the EU. In fact, the coordination problem is probably even
broader and more complex than indicated by their paper, given the cross-county differ-
ences in asylum policies across many dimensions. These include border protection and
enforcement of visa requirements, the efficiency of application processing, the generosity
of conceding full or subsidiary refugee status, dispersion policies restricting the freedom
about residential choice as well as access to the labour market and the welfare state.
These differences make it hard to even think about an ‘optimal’ policy. Moreover, at
the heart of the problem is a complicated political economy game between the Member
States, with potentially many trade-offs that involve humanitarian concerns, efficiency
concerns, signalling, as well as power politics that are addressed by policies such as the
36 I thank Andreas Backhaus for pointing me to this ruling.
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speed of administrative processes or the generosity of admission policy. The suggestion to
implement a two-stage policy with decisions about asylum claims at the outer borders and
with a transfer and quota system might help mitigating many of these strategic incentives.
Ultimately, the key question for dealing with refugee migration appears that of inte-
gration. With a subsidiary refugee status that might last years and with non-refoulement
kicking in after the asylum application is rejected, while a voluntary return is possible at
any stage, the refugees’ incentives for integration appear complicated. Fast and transpar-
ent decisions are probably a way to provide those refugees with clear incentives who
consider permanent residence. Yet, the status quo seems not to take this into account, in
particular given the need to clear the fallout of the first months of the refugee crisis.
Moreover, the evidence shown by the authors suggests that integration might be a very
long and time-consuming process. Nevertheless, the status quo with its uncoordinated
national policies and the associated economic and political costs appears unsustainable.
Whether the proposed solution of securing EU outer borders, dealing with application
before refugees even enter EU, and coordinated asylum policies with a matching-based
allocation of refugees across host countries provides a feasible scenario will have to be
seen in the future. In any case, the authors provide a sober and evidence-based contribu-
tion to the debate that is urgently needed and will serve as important and useful refer-
ence for future discussions of these issues.
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Antonella Trigari
Bocconi University
What does this paper do?
This paper provides a wide-ranging analysis of refugee migration, with emphasis on the
recent refugee crisis. The paper first reviews the institutional framework regulating asy-
lum policies and elaborates on how European countries interpret and put into practice
these regulations. Second, it describes the key features of the current refugee crisis,
mainly in terms of the distributions by routes of entry, country of origin and country of
destination. Next, the paper compares the labour market outcomes of economic
migrants and refugees by estimating the gap in their employment probabilities (using
past refugee waves). Finally, it discusses the economics of refugee migration focusing on
the economic and political trade-offs of asylum policies and emphasizing the benefits
from coordination among European countries.
To succeed in these heterogeneous tasks, the authors make use of several sources of
data: the UNHCR Population Statistics, Frontex Data, the European Union Labor
Force Survey (EULFS) and the German Ministry for Immigration and Refugees Survey.
Background
Definition of a refugee. The paper clarifies the definition of a refugee. The GCR 1951,
defines a refugee as ‘a person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country’. This definition emphasizes
the presence of a threat for an individual person (i.e. an individual persecution) as the
reason for granting the refugee status. In most cases, individual persecution is thus the
basis of a permanent refugee status. To address general threats, the UNHCR considers
as refugees all persons fleeing civil wars and ethnic, tribal and religious violence and
whose country is unable/unwilling to protect them. In this case, the underlying threat is
general, rather than individual, and it often leads to alternative forms of temporary
humanitarian protection. In other words, individuals are considered refugees without
the need of an individual status determination, but permanent asylum is not
guaranteed.
Two refugee crises. To put the current refugee crisis into perspective, the paper com-
pares it to the early 1990s Balkan crisis. Here are the numbers. In 1992, at the peak of
the Balkan crisis, 850,000 applications were submitted, of which 700,000 in Europe.
Refugees came mostly from the Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, Rwanda and Somalia. The
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stock of refugees reached its first peak in 1992, with almost 15 million refugees world-
wide. In 2015, at the peak of the current crisis, over 2 million applications were pre-
sented, with 1.5 million in Europe. The refugees originated mostly from Syria,
Afghanistan, Iraq and North Africa. In 2015, the stock of refugees reached its second
and highest peak, with more than 15 million refugees worldwide.
The case of Syrians. The case of Syrians, in particular, illustrates the nature and extent
of the current crisis. Before the conflict, the population of Syria was 22 million. In
December 2015, almost 12 million people were classified as displaced (i.e. had to move
away from their home). Out of those 12 million, about 6.6 million were internally dis-
placed (stayed in Syria) and 5 million autonomously reached a third country. In this lat-
ter group, only 500,000 were granted asylum (or were waiting for it) in the EU, while
4.5 million were under a refugee-like status in a neighbour country to Syria. Finally,
only 180,000 people were offered resettlement to a safe host country.
What does the paper find? And what is my reading of the paper’s story?
There are four key messages delivered by this paper. First, there exists large heterogene-
ity in recent refugee policies across Europe. Countries differ substantially in efficiency
(e.g. the processing rate is 37% in Greece, 73% in UK), generosity (the recognition rate
is 2% in Greece, 18% in Denmark), type of status granted to a successful applicant
(18% full GCR status in Italy, 91% in UK), list of ‘safe countries of origin’ (0 in
Norway, 26 in UK), labour market access (1month waiting period in Portugal, 1 year in
UK), health care access (unrestricted only in Italy, Belgium, Ireland). Second, the cur-
rent refugee crisis led to a massive hike in illegal crossing and asylum applications.
Illegal crossing increased 17-fold from 2009 to 2015 mostly via Central Mediterranean,
Eastern Mediterranean and Western Balkan entry routes and mainly from Syria (38%)
and Afghanistan (20%). Asylum applications increased five-fold over the same period
mainly from Syria (17%) and Afghanistan (10%) and mostly to Germany, Sweden, Italy
and Hungary. Third, refugees experience a delayed labour market integration relative
to economic migrants. Refugees are about 10% less likely to be employed than eco-
nomic migrants and the gap disappears only after 15 20 years. Finally, the paper offers
a way to optimal policy by attempting a cost and benefit analysis along a number of
dimensions: permanent versus temporary status; urban versus rural location; and dis-
persed versus concentrated location. The policy prescription is coordination among
receiving countries with a market for trading quotas in order to minimize total costs of
granting asylum to a given number of refugees.
How do these findings come together to provide a coherent story? Here is my reading.
First, the existing regulatory framework is unsuitable to handle the European crisis for
two reasons: it leaves much room for host country interpretation and does not envisage a
mechanism to spread the refugee burden. At the same time, the current refugee burden
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is unprecedented and unequally distributed. For this reason, countries implement hetero-
geneous policies, in large part to deter applications. For example, they delay labour mar-
ket access after arrival or allow uncertainty about application outcome and permanence.
These policies, in turn, cause lasting adverse effects on refugee employment outcomes by
discouraging investment in host-specific human capital. Thus, coordination in asylum
policies would reduce the free-rider problem, alleviate countries’ distorted incentives and
mitigate the adverse consequences on refugees’ economic integration.
Comments
Let me now provide some more specific comments on the details of the analysis.
Heterogeneous policies: applications received versus efficiency. In Figure 4,
the authors show that there is no correlation between efficiency, as measured by
the processing rate of applications, and the number of applications received (normalized
per 10,000 population). Based on this finding, the authors resolve that a country’s
processing rate can be thought of as a choice variable, potentially used to influence the
application inflow. The figure, however, raises questions about the generality of the
result. In fact, alternative normalizations or the use of absolute numbers may reveal
some negative correlation. For example, normalizing by GDP would capture the effec-
tive refugee burden: Norway has small population but high GDP per capita and so
would be closer to the left on the figure, while Spain would move to the right. Also, the
use of absolute numbers might be more appropriate, as they would capture quasi-fixed
costs of processing applications. If these alternative analyses indeed imply a negative cor-
relation, then the authors’ interpretation of efficiency as a choice variable would not
be justified.
Heterogeneous policies: efficiency versus generosity. Figure 5 documents a posi-
tive correlation between efficiency (processing rate) and generosity (recognition rate)
across countries. Based on this evidence, the authors argue that countries are not faster
simply by rejecting more applications. This in turn suggests that countries may be choos-
ing two dimensions to influence the application flow generosity and efficiency.
However, the positive correlation may also suggest that some countries are faster simply
because they are more generous. Moreover, selection may explain differences in recog-
nition rates. For example, it might be the case that only richer and more educated peo-
ple reach countries farther away from border crossing points the UK and Northern
Europe. These people are better equipped to submit a successful application, inducing a
positive correlation between generosity (they are more likely to be eligible) and efficiency
(they are more likely to put together a complete and in order application). To address
this issue, the authors could control for distance to border crossing points and/or per-
form robustness checks by dropping the UK, Denmark and Greece.
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Labour market integration: employment gaps. To analyse labour market integra-
tion of refugees, the authors use the 2008 wave of the EULFS, which covers past refugee
waves. The main finding is that there is a 10% employment gap between refugees and
economic migrants and that this gap decreases with the length of stay. The authors
explain these results by arguing that refugees are conceptually very different from eco-
nomic immigrants. The idea is that of a ‘forced marriage’ versus a ‘chosen match’: eco-
nomic immigrants chose a country where to migrate while refugees did not have much
of a choice. Also, refugees have lower incentives to invest in human capital, with lasting
but fading effects on employment outcomes.
These results raise some concerns. First, Figure 11 shows that the refugee immigrant
gap might be driven by the UK and Ireland the gap is much larger in these two coun-
tries compared to the rest with about 40% in Ireland, 20% in UK and almost 0% in
other countries. The revised version of the paper shows in the Appendix that the esti-
mates are robust to dropping the UK and/or Ireland.
Another interesting insight from Figure 11 is that the immigrant native employment
gap is smaller in Ireland and the UK than in most other countries. It suggests that eco-
nomic migrants may be positively selected in certain destinations. It is hard to become
an economic migrant (obtain a working visa) in Ireland and the UK, especially from out-
side the EU. It would then be interesting to control for the strictness of immigration rules
in the host country by area of origin.
An important question is why the refugee-native employment gap is much higher in
the UK and Ireland than in other countries. For example, differences in the quality of
education between origin and host country may be higher for the UK and Ireland than
for other host countries. Or, as Borjas and Monras (2017) argue, refugee shocks
adversely affect labour market opportunities of competing natives, and often have a
favourable impact on complementary workers. In the UK and Ireland, refugees are
more likely to be complementary to the native working population, hence the higher
employment rate for natives. In southern countries, instead, refugees are more likely to
be substitutes, hence the lower employment rate for natives. The authors could control
for the number of refugees in the host country and for the joint distribution of skills/sec-
tors of natives and refugees.
Decreasing employment gap: cohort effects. Figure 10 documents that the employ-
ment gap is decreasing in the duration of the stay. A key question is whether this
happens because of a duration effect (integration into the receiving country) or a cohort
effect (composition of refugees). Also, the gap in 2008 (the year of the survey) is smaller
at 15 years since arrival. This finding could, however, be driven by the Balkan refugees
from the early 1990s, who are closer in culture and education, and so easier to integrate.
Data on more cross-sections seems key to address these issues.
In general, it would be desirable to include more controls in the analysis. For
example, finer education levels, experience, wealth, income, etc. Also, the interaction of
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education with the country of origin seems important since the quality of education may
vary significantly across countries, leading to skill downgrading. Moreover, it would be
useful to control for policies in the host country, such as labour market access or share of
refugees with full GCR status.
Policy trade-offs. The paper emphasizes several important policy trade-offs. The first
relates to granting permanent or temporary status. Permanent status incentivizes invest-
ment in human capital, but has political costs and thus creates a free-rider problem.
One concern with the analysis is that the preferences of refugees are not mentioned.
Refugees, in fact, may want to return to their origin country, as it happened in the
Balkan case. A permanent refugee status would not be needed in this case.
A second trade-off concerns the geographical allocation of refugees. Should it be in
urban or rural areas? Should refugees be concentrated or dispersed? There are lower
hosting costs in rural areas, for example, due to housing, but higher political costs.
Refugees, in fact, lead to increasing support for right-wing anti-immigration parties in
rural areas but not urban ones. Concentration helps integration into the labour market,
due to contacts and network, but leads to unequally distributed costs within the country.
At the same time, a number of non-monetary costs of concentration are not mentioned
in the paper: lower incentives to learn the local language and culture, the rise of
‘ghettos’, such as Molenbeek in Brussels, the fact that ethnic segregation lowers govern-
ment quality (Alesina and Zhuravskaya, 2011).
One concluding remark
The paper emphasizes differences between the current and the 1990s refugee crises:
the concomitance of the current crisis with the aftershocks of a deep recession; the
higher uncertainty about the resolution of the causes generating the flows; the larger
magnitudes and the cultural differences of refugees. It then convincingly argues that
these differences lead to greater political costs. But the paper offers no formal analy-
sis of these political costs, focusing instead on the economic costs associated with
labour market integration. Political economy’s analyses of refugee migration should
be high on the agenda!
Panel discussion
George Borjas emphasized that the paper does not examine the role of refugee agencies
which, as intermediaries, have their own agenda and thus may not necessarily act in the
best interests of refugees. He indicated that there are three different parties in the proc-
ess (i.e. refugees, receiving countries and refugee agencies) and ignoring the latter may
give a misleading picture of the issue. Sam Langfield asked to what extent a coordinated
policy that secures Europe’s outer borders and deals with asylum claims before refugees
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have crossed the border can be achieved with the agreement recently signed between
Turkey and EU governments.
Timothy Hatton argued that the lack of coordination of policies across Europe is the
main problem. Refugee hosting is a public good due to the humanitarian satisfaction
everyone experiences if a refugee crisis is solved in a satisfactory way. Thus, there is
need for a social planner and harmonization of policies. In a related point, Andrea
Ichino wondered if the lack of coordination is a problem specific to the refugee crisis or
a more general problem of European institutions. Kevin O’Rourke asked if the authors
can obtain data on employment experiences of people that have been granted perma-
nent versus temporary refugee status. Moreover, he pointed out that right now the refu-
gees who make it into Europe are a selected sample, for example, likely richer and
younger than the average citizen in the home country. If the asylum granting process is
located in a third country outside the EU instead, this selection will likely change.
Richard Portes questioned whether the number of refugees in recent years is higher in
terms of total population (from both the receiving and sending countries) from what we
have observed in the past, prior to World War II.
Replying to comments, Christian Dustmann first highlighted that despite the com-
plexity and importance of refugee migration both politically and economically, the data
available so far is simply insufficient to draw strong policy conclusions. He also clarified
that refugee agencies are not as prevalent in Europe as they are in the United States,
and argued that the agreement between Turkey and the EU was more an emergency
measure. Regarding the lack of coordination in Europe, he agreed that EU institutions
need to be adjusted but stressed the fact that this and other issues are being dealt with
and that these institutions are being improved in the process. This ultimately represents
strength of the EU rather than a weakness.
DATA APPENDIX
A.1 ASYLUM APPLICATIONS AND REFUGEE STATUS RECOGNITIONS
The annual information on UNHCR’s population of concern and asylum application
processing are taken from the UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database, which
classifies persons of concern as follows: (1) refugees, individuals recognized under the 1951
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, its 1967 Protocol, and/or the 1969 OAU
Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa; individuals
recognized in accordance with the UNHCR Statute; individuals granted complementary
forms of protection or enjoying temporary protection; and, since 2007, individuals in a
refugee-like situation; (2) asylum seekers, individuals who have sought international protec-
tion and whose claims for refugee status have not yet been determined; (3) returned refugees,
former refugees who have returned to their country of origin but are yet to be fully inte-
grated; (4) IDPs, individuals who have been forced to leave their homes or places of ha-
bitual residence as a result of, or to avoid the effects of, armed conflict, and who have
not crossed an international border; (5) returned IDPs, IDPs who were beneficiaries of
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UNHCR’s protection and assistance activities and who returned to their areas of origin
or habitual residence during the year; (6) stateless persons; (7) other individuals of concern, those
who do not fall directly into any of the previous groups but to whom UNHCR extends
its protection and/or assistance services. The data on asylum application processing in-
clude the numbers of applications submitted, pending applications at the beginning and
end of the year, applications recognized, applications rejected and applications otherwise
closed. Data are reported bilaterally for all world countries. As of the time of writing, the
data, which are available on line, had been updated on 31 December 2014.
UNHCR also provides a monthly data set of asylum applications lodged in
38 European and 6 non-European countries between 1999 and 2015. Where possi-
ble, our figures exclude repeat/re-opened asylum applications and applications
lodged on appeal or with courts.
A.2 ILLEGAL CROSSINGS
Quarterly data on illegal entries by route and origin country for each quarter from
Q12009 to Q42015 were obtained from Frontex, the European Agency for the
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States
of the EU, which began gathering such information in 2009. Frontex defines illegal cross-
ings as ‘the number of third-country nationals detected by Member State authorities
when entering or attempting to enter illegally the territory between border crossing points
at external borders’. The recorded number of illegal crossings may differ from the actual
flows of undocumented immigrants for at least two reasons: first, not all illegal crossings
are detected, meaning that detected crossings are a lower bound for actual unauthorized
crossings. Illegal crossings are determined by the combination of the number of people
who attempt an illegal entry and the level of enforcement. Any variation in the number
of detected crossings, therefore, can be due to variations both in the underlying flow of
people and in the border enforcement intensity. This complicates comparisons over time
and across routes of recorded crossings. A second issue is that multiple entry attempts by
the same migrant are re-counted, leading to an over-estimation of the number of individ-
uals attempting to cross the border illegally. Nonetheless, in the absence of reliable infor-
mation on the size of these two effects, detected illegal crossings are the best available
proxy for undocumented migratory pressure.
The data set distinguishes between the following nine routes: the Central
Mediterranean route, the circular route from Albania to Greece, the eastern border
route, the Eastern Mediterranean routes (sea and land), the West African route, the
Western Mediterranean routes (sea and land) and the Western Balkan route.
A.3 LABOUR MARKET OUTCOMES OF REFUGEE AND ECONOMIC MIGRANTS
Our analysis is based on the 2008 wave of the EULFS, which is conducted in the 27
Member States of the EU and two countries of the European Free Trade Association
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(EFTA). It is a large quarterly household sample survey of people aged 15 and over,
as well as of persons outside the labour force. The National Statistical Institute of
each member country is responsible for selecting the sample, preparing the question-
naires, conducting the direct interviews among households and forwarding the results
to Eurostat in accordance with the common coding scheme.
In certain countries, the 2008 survey included an ad hoc module that asked for in-
formation on reason for migration, thereby allowing us to identify refugees versus other (eco
nomic) migrants. We, therefore, focus our analysis on the countries in which this ad hoc
module was administered: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Spain, France, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Netherland, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and the UK. The reason-for-
migration question was asked to all non-native individuals who arrived in the country
of residence when they were over 16 years of age.37 The 2008 interviewees were asked
to choose among 8 options: (1) employment, intra-corporate transfer; (2) employment,
job found before migrating; (3) employment, no job found before migrating; (4) study;
(5) international protection; (6) accompanying family/family reunification; (7) family
formation and (8) other. We assign the label refugee to all those who selected option (5),
international protection, and the label economic migrant to all those choosing any of the
other reasons. The sample for our empirical analysis includes individuals of working
age (between 25 and 64 years old), not in full-time education or military service. After
dropping all observations with missing data on education, reason for migration, or area
of origin, we have an estimation sample of 476,518 individuals, of whom 440,594 are
natives, 33,370 are economic immigrants and 2,554 are refugees.
APPENDIX TABLES
REFERENCES
37 Non native individuals (immigrants and refugees) are defined as ‘foreign born’ in all countries except
Germany where they are defined as ‘foreign nationals’.
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Adda, J., C. Dustmann and S. Gorlach (2016). ‘The dynamics of return migration, human capi
tal accumulation, and wage assimilation’, Mimeo, UCL.
Table A1. Refugee-native and immigrant-native employment rate differentials
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Immigrant 0.059*** 0.085*** 0.070***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Refugee 0.161*** 0.216*** 0.183*** 0.161*** 0.215*** 0.183***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016)
Immigrant EU15 0.032*** 0.041*** 0.043***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Immigrant nonEU15 0.072*** 0.105*** 0.082***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Gender and age X X X X
Education X X
Observations 476,518 476,518 476,518 476,518 476,518 476,518
R2 0.02 0.18 0.22 0.02 0.18 0.22
Notes: The table reports differences in employment probabilities between economic migrants/refugee migrants
relative to natives (columns 1 3) and between EU15 migrants/non EU15 migrants/refugee migrants relative to
natives (columns 4 6) estimated from linear probability models. The sample includes all individuals aged between
25 and 64, not in education or military service. All regressions include host country ﬁxed effects. Gender: dum
mies for male. Age: dummies for ﬁve year age groups. Education: dummies for lower secondary and tertiary edu
cation. Robust standard errors in brackets.
***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.1.
Source: Own calculations based on EULFS 2008.
Table A2. Employment rate differentials by area of origin
NMS12 Other
Europe
Other
Africa
South &
East Asia
N.Africa &
Middle East
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Immigrant 0.031*** 0.083*** 0.034*** 0.101*** 0.182***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010)
Refugee 0.056 0.083*** 0.224*** 0.234*** 0.325***
(0.056) (0.027) (0.036) (0.041) (0.033)
Observations 445,719 447,643 443,300 444,664 445,365
R2 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.23
F test (Imm. versus Ref.) 0.21 0.00 25.03 9.96 17.45
Prob>F 0.65 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: The table reports differences in employment probabilities between economic migrants/refugee migrants
relative to natives estimated separately (through linear probability models) for different areas of origin. The sam
ple includes all individuals aged between 25 and 64, not in education or military service. Economic migrants
from EU15 countries are excluded. All regressions control for gender, age (dummy variables for 5 year age
groups), education (dummy variables for lower secondary and tertiary education) and host country ﬁxed effects.
Tests for the equality of coefﬁcients for economic vs refugee migrants are reported. Robust standard errors in
brackets.
***p< 0.01, **p< 0.05, *p< 0.1.
Source: Own calculations based on EULFS 2008.
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